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Cost-benefit Analysis of Mine Clearance Operations in
Cambodia

Final Report (February 2005): Bjørn Gildestad

Preamble
This Cost-Benefit Analysis of Mine Clearance Operations in Cambodia was initiated by the
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) in cooperation with the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and carried out during the period
November 2004 to February 2005. The author of the report is Mr Bjørn Gildestad of Nordic
Consulting Group (NCG), Oslo, Norway bjogil@online.no
The study was completed with input and advice from a number of persons at CMAA, UNDP
and other institutions and organisations in Cambodia (see list of contacts in Annex 2). To all
these the author would like to express his thankful appreciation for the interesting cooperation
and the valuable information supplied. A particularly active support was provided by the
Senior Adviser UNDP/CMAA Mr Dominique Pierre Guéret and the Mine Action and Aid
Coordination Specialist at UNDP Phnom Penh Mr Julien Chevillard.
Many persons have contributed to the report in various ways; still the responsibility for any
factual inaccuracies or errors in the analysis rests entirely with the author. Furthermore the
views, opinions and conclusions expressed should not be attributed to any other person or
institution.
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Executive Summary
Cambodia is seriously affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (Uxo), due to almost
three decades of various armed conflicts in the latter part of the twentieth century. Landmines
and Uxo explosions are claimed to have caused more than 60,000 victims since 1979. In 1996
the number of casualties rose as high as 4313, out of which the civilian share was 40%, 772
persons were injured or killed in 2003 and 891 in 2004. In addition to the accident risk, mines
and Uxo also constitute a significant obstacle to rehabilitation and development activities in
many areas.
Mine action resources have to be carefully managed to respond to national humanitarian and
development priorities. Besides humanitarian imperatives mine action in Cambodia has a
crucial role to play in supporting the socio-economic development and poverty reduction
strategies set by the Royal Government (RGC). However, little information about the socioeconomic benefits of mine action has so far been collected.
This cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of mine clearance operations in Cambodia was launched by
the national regulatory and coordinating body, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victims
Assistance Authority (CMAA) in cooperation with UNDP. The socio-economic benefits of
mine action will be assessed covering the period since the start of the programme in 1992, and
a cost benefit analysis model developed for the use of the RGC and stakeholders involved in
mine clearance.
Cambodia staged aggressive economic growth between 1993 and 1996, but ongoing civil
strife, domestic political instability, the Asian financial crisis, and the failure of the
government to implement necessary policy and legal reforms sharply slowed down economic
activities and foreign investment. Thus about 36 % of the population still lives in absolute
poverty, lacking the necessary minimum level of 2100 calories per person per day. Livelihood
systems are not secure in particular for most rural communities, which comprise
predominantly subsistence farmers. An estimated 60 % of the households there suffer from
food deficits. Cambodia’s land problems are particularly acute. During the years with war and
conflicts hundreds of thousands of people were displaced, entire families were wiped-out, and
different groups obtained overlapping claims to the same land or its resources.
The mine/Uxo problem is still serious even though the number of mine victims is decreasing.
Uxo victims, however, now constitute more than 50% of the casualties and the number is
rising. About 70% of the mine victims are exposed to accidents while travelling, doing farm
work or collecting wood, whereas 59% of the Uxo victims were tampering with the Uxo,
while another 18% were lookers on. Males are much more frequently exposed to mine and
Uxo accidents then females. Men and boys constitute 88% of the total number of casualties.
At mine accidents 80% of the victims are men and 11% boys, Uxo incidents, however,
involve just as many boys as men.
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular which parts of
it that should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the
estimates of contaminated area.
Mine action is considered by the RGC as one of the top priorities for rehabilitation and
development of the country. It has been fully integrated among Cambodia’s Millennium
Development Goals and in its Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Kingdom of Cambodia is
committed to the Ottawa Convention on the ban of landmines
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The Cambodian National Mine Action Strategy 2004 states that clearance of the worstaffected areas will be given priority to reduce as soon as possible the risk of death or injury to
individuals living in landmine/Uxo -affected areas. The goal is to clear the remaining parts of
the severely contaminated land by 2012-2015, while targeting a decrease in the number of
mine and Uxo accidents towards a minimum at the end of the same period. Realistically it is
anticipated, however, that mine action operations will need to continue even beyond 2020.
It is also admitted that while the clearance of minefields can reduce the number of mine
accidents, other measures like mine risk education will have to be strengthened in order to
reduce the number of Uxo casualties. From 1992 to December 2003 the various mine
clearance operators had cleared a total area of about 252 km2.
The mine action strategy distinguishes between clearance of severely mined villages with
high levels of casualties, and providing access to productive land improving the living
conditions for poor people, de-mining of specific areas such as historical sites to promote
development of the tourist industry, or clearing infrastructure such as roads allowing
communication with other parts of the country. The programme aims at putting in place a
community based, transparent, participative and decentralized process to identify those
villages, families and persons that will be entitled to receive cleared lands.
The appraisal of the gains from mine action towards reduced human loss are based on
calculations of the potential contributions from an average Cambodian mine victim to the
productive activities of the country. This must not, however, be conceived of as the value of a
human life. Still it is in line with benefit calculations regularly undertaken by other types of
initiatives aimed at saving lives and reducing accidents risk.
The agricultural land cleared under the Cambodian mine action programme is specifically
destined for distribution among the poorest parts of the population. The staple food item in
Cambodia is rice. The output from rice production will therefore be used as a guideline for the
production value, also including livestock production as a complementary trade. Mine
clearance related to irrigation canals and systems aims at reopening the possibility for
irrigation of agricultural areas. Clearance of a canal area can thus benefit a much wider extent
of agricultural land.
These are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a significant
economic loss. This could call for an improved reporting system.
Clearance of roads will benefit the road users providing more convenient transport
opportunities, reduced travel time and travel costs. Mine-contaminated road links may
generally hinder road users from travelling the shortest route to their destinations. Clearance
of wells, school areas and health stations will in the same way provide user benefits from the
reduced need for travelling to alternative facilities in more distant locations. Clearance of
historical sites and temples are evaluated as of their capacity to create more revenues to the
country from the tourist industry.
Four agencies are currently involved in the mine action programme in Cambodia. There is
little standardization among the operators as of the approach to the tasks, the set-up of teams
for the field work, techniques and types of equipment in use. Competition among the
operators is limited, as there is no regular practice of putting larger clearance tasks out on
tender. Each operator to a large extent benefits from its proper and regular sources for funding
The operators should be required to provide better data on the cost of conducting mine action
activities. Some operators are in the process of developing their accounting procedures, which
could result in better cost-estimates with more details on costs of clearing different types of
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areas, with various approaches and techniques etc, information which to a large degree is nonexistent now.
Mine action is contributing substantial values to the Cambodian economy and the country in
general. Analysis of the 2004 clearance programme comes out with a benefit cost ratio (BCR)
of 0.38, implying that benefits are in general 38% higher than the costs, on basis of an average
clearance cost rate of US$ 0.9 per m2. The internal rate of return will on the same assumptions
be 14%.
The benefits amount to about US$ 37 million in total, distributed with 80% on clearance for
development and 20% on the reduced human loss. Roads and bridges make up the largest
parts with 45%, even though such clearance tasks only comprise 19% of the total area cleared.
Smaller size tasks related to irrigation canals also contribute considerably. For agricultural
land the situation is inverse, it constitutes as much as 65% of the cleared area while making
up 28% of the benefits.
The benefits from renewed access to more direct road links can be considerably larger that the
costs generally required for clearance. Clearance of roads and bridges could thus be
undertaken also in cases of relatively high cost levels. The benefits from renewed access to
wells for local water supply, schools and health stations have likewise few difficulties with
justifying clearance, on basis of the reduced travel time and travel costs for the users and the
pupils.
These are excellent candidates in a development perspective, and such tasks should be given
priority as far as benefits in economic terms are concerned. It is evident that the programme
benefits could be enhanced by diverting more of the clearance activity towards rural
infrastructure like roads, water supply, schools etc, and also to sites attracting tourism.
The output per ha of arable land is on the average rather moderate in Cambodia. Yet the main
conclusion is not that clearance of agricultural areas is unprofitable. There is, however, a call
for conscious prioritization, a planning process capable of identifying those areas and tasks
that are of highest importance to the local communities.
In the agricultural sector a high priority should be given to the reopening of irrigation systems
permitting dry season cultivation of arable land. Benefits could here be extensive and have
important consequences for the rural economy and for food production.
Clearance for casualty reduction also needs to be well targeted in most cases and locations in
order to have the desired effect. Improved assessments could be made of which parts of the
extensive mined area in the country that are generating the bulk of the mine/Uxo accidents,
representing a danger to the people now and in future years with expected population
movements etc. In spite of the excellent statistics on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents in
Cambodia, there are lacking elements in the analysis that could help direct the clearance
activity towards the most risky locations.
Programme benefits cover clearance costs in all provinces. The 4 provinces of Battambang,
Odtar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Preah Vihear collect the bulk (78%) of the benefits
from the 2004 clearance programme. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is, however, highest in
Kampong Cham and Pailin. The main part of the benefits comes from gains related to
economic development. Still the reduced human loss is an essential factor, contributing to
increase the programme benefits particularly in Pailin.
Mine action’s contribution in the years 1992-2003 to increase the country’s paddy production
could amount to over 50,000 tonnes annually. This production increase has been made
possible on reclaimed agricultural land and through renewed access to irrigation canals. This
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constitutes in general a 3% growth in paddy production in the mine action regions, but could
be even more important for food security in provinces like Pailin, Kep, Banteay Meanchey
and Battambang.
A transparent and equitable system for redistribution of the reclaimed land is an important
goal under the mine action programme. The cleared areas may have provided land and
contributed to improve land security for about 160,000 families over the period 1992-2003,
that is to say for over 13,000 on the average each year.
Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells has improved the access to safe drinking
water in rural areas. An estimated 1400 wells and ponds have been cleared in the course of the
mine action programme 1992-2003.
De-mining school premises contributes to improving the education system so that more
children can be able to complete school. Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide
access to rural health stations, which are much needed in the fight against the spread of
diseases and to reduce child and maternal mortality. It is estimated that about 60 health
stations have been cleared under the mine action programme.
There are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a significant
economic loss. This could call for an improved reporting system, if possible through CMVIS.
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular what parts of
it should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the estimates of
the contaminated area.
The CMAA database on cleared areas needs to be consolidated, so that it can provide official
figures for clearance on location (province, district), types of areas, techniques etc for the
individual years since the start of the mine action programme. As of today this information
exists on different files which can be incomplete and inconsistent.
The operators should be required to provide better data on the cost of conducting mine action
activities. As a first approach more information about clearance time (in hours) of different
types of tasks and areas could be demanded.
A library or Information and Documentation Centre should be established at CMAA to secure
the institutional memory.
Annex 1 contains some straightforward methods, based on cost-benefit analysis, to be applied
as instruments for assessing socio-economic and poverty reduction impacts of future mine
clearance operations. The approach is based on data presented and methods developed in the
previous parts of the report.
The CMAA Socio-economic Cluster should in particular have a responsibility with following
up the cost-benefit analysis.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The mine/Uxo problem
Cambodia is seriously affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (Uxo), due to almost
three decades of various armed conflicts in the latter part of the twentieth century. Landmines
and Uxo explosions are claimed to have caused more than 60,000 victims since 1979. In 1996
the number of casualties rose as high as 4313, out of which the civilian share was 40%. Of the
772 persons injured or killed in 2003 and the 891 in 2004 almost all were civilians. One third
of the victims were children in the countryside, especially in areas considered indispensable
for new settlement of poor people.
Cambodia was heavily bombarded by the USA between 1969 and 1973 in connection with the
Vietnam war, approximately 2.4 million tons of bombs were dropped over the country.
During the Khmer Rouge period 1975-79 virtually all well-educated Cambodians were killed
or forced into exile. Eventually, an estimated 1.5 million Cambodians, or one in six died from
execution, starvation, or disease before the overthrow of the regime by Vietnam, the former
ally of the Khmer Rouge.
The country lost almost an entire generation of its educated people and many war-affected
groups, internally displaced people and returning refugees, widows, orphans, child
combatants, remain acutely vulnerable. An estimated one person in 250 is disabled, and war
plus the ongoing scourge of landmines have resulted in the highest proportion of amputees
(one in 384) recorded in the world. The war period left Cambodia with between four and six
million mines and millions of Uxo in the ground. In addition to the accident risk, mines and
Uxo also constitute a significant obstacle to rehabilitation and development activities in many
areas. This situation prevails despite the fact that mine action programmes covering clearance,
marking, awareness rising and training have been going on since 1992, resulting in clearance
of 251 km2 of land so far.
According to the Level One Survey (L1S) from 2002, about 12% of the villages in Cambodia
have to cope with high contamination of landmines and Uxo. The problem is severe and
access to essential facilities such as water, roads, bridges and cultivable land is restricted and
hazardous for many rural civilians. Still it has been recognized that the L1S estimates for
contaminated land were too high. Preliminarily a share of 10% of the L1S figures has been
proposed as reflecting the actual situation (2004), comprising 425 km2 of contaminated land,
out of which about 300 km2 have been given the highest priority. 1 Data from the operators
suggest a priority area of 260 km2.
Uxo victims have over the last years constituted more than 50% of the victims. While people
are exposed to mine accidents during farm work, collecting wood or travelling, the majority
of the Uxo victims were actually tampering with the Uxo. This fact raises the question to what
extent clearance of contaminated areas can contribute to alleviate the risk of Uxo accidents.
The overall development goal of the mine action programme is to reduce the level and impact
of land mine/Uxo contamination in Cambodia in a transparently prioritised, cost effective and
safe manner, so that the maximum number of people, predominantly rural but also urban, can
go about their lives free from the threat of land mines/Uxo thus permitting reconstruction,
reintegration and development activities to take place in a safe environment. The National
Mine Action Strategy 2004 states that Cambodia has a long-term mine & UXO problem,
which will require national striving in mine action for the next two decades. The medium1

See chapter 3.1.
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term vision is to move towards zero impact from land mines and UXO by 2012, the long-term
vision is to have a Cambodia free from the negative humanitarian and socio-economic
impacts of landmines/ UXO by 2020. Cambodia is a state party to the Anti Personnel Mine
Ban Treaty (the Ottawa Convention).
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority (CMAA) was established in
September 2000, replacing the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) as the national
coordinating and regulatory body in charge of mine action management and policy
development. UNDP program support to CMAA started in 2001. Other agencies operating
within mine action comprise local and international companies and NGOs, government
institutions and the armed forces. The coordination is rather loose.
Mine action resources have to be carefully managed to respond to national humanitarian and
development priorities. Besides humanitarian imperatives mine action in Cambodia has a
crucial role to play in supporting the socio-economic development and poverty reduction
strategies set by the Royal Government (RGC).
However, little information about the socio-economic benefits of mine action has so far been
collected. Furthermore there is a lack of specific tools to assist in the development of nation
wide mine action priorities based on the amount of resources available and the development
objectives of the RGC, and at the local level in the selection of minefields for clearance and in
particular for conducting socio-economic cost-benefit analyses.

1.2 Objectives of the cost-benefit analysis
This cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of mine clearance operations in Cambodia was launched by
CMAA in cooperation with UNDP. The socio-economic benefits of mine action will be
assessed covering the period since the start of the programme in 1992, and a cost benefit
analysis model developed for the use of the RGC and stakeholders involved in mine
clearance.
The overall objective of the assignment is to:
− Provide a quantified assessment of mine action contribution to the socio-economic
development of the country and the poverty reduction strategy/ Cambodian
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) over the period 1993-2003.
− Devise a mechanism, based on a cost-benefit analysis, to assess the socio-economic
and poverty reduction impact of future mine action operations.
The analysis of the “benefits” of mine clearance should include poverty reduction/ human
development indicators in addition to the economic indicators, allowing for an assessment of
the contribution of mine clearance to the achievement of the Cambodian MDG and the
National Poverty Reduction Strategy. 2
A tool will be devised for cost-benefit analysis of mine action sector activities, looking at the
impact of clearance on other sectors, such as infrastructure development, access to natural
resources, agriculture and tourism and the ultimate impact on overall development and
poverty reduction. The socio-economic impact of mine clearance in religious and historical
sites, especially Angkor should be duly analysed and quantified.
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1.3 Main approach and methodology
Conceptually, the socio-economic loss from accidents and contamination with landmines and
Uxo can be divided in three broad categories:
(1) Loss of life, health, human production potential, and human welfare resulting from
mine/Uxo accidents;
(2) Blocking access to mine-infested land and loss of associated production or
consumption benefits from the areas concerned.
(3) Distortion of behaviour due to the existence of mines or Uxo, with consequent socioeconomic losses resulting from longer travel distances or journeys and activities not
undertaken due to greater distances and difficulties etc.
The costs connected with addressing the problem are related to the different aspects of the
mine action programme, clearance operations, mine accidents during clearance operations,
mine risk education and awareness, programme administration, planning etc.
Benefits minus costs or net benefits will evidently be a relevant socio-economic criterion,
dividing by costs facilitates comparison of projects or clearance tasks of different sizes. The
benefit-cost ratio or BCR (benefits minus cost divided by cost) is thus a widely applied
criterion for ranking projects.
Benefit – Cost

Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR):

Cost
The higher the BCR the more well-justified is the project. A negative ratio indicates that this
clearance activity cannot be vindicated on the basis of the socio-economic benefits alone, as
far as they are considered in the analysis. Different projects or clearance tasks can be ranked
by their BCRs, and if resources are limited there will be a cut-off point for the BCR,
below which the project/task concerned should not be implemented.
This needs not imply, however, that other than economic benefits and costs are irrelevant;
frequently there will be additional considerations to take into account. Still in many cases the
non-economic benefits may be related to the same factors that are basic for the calculation of
economic benefits, in mine action this will typically be the number of mine/Uxo victims
expected avoided in future years, and the size and types of area that can be reclaimed for
useful purposes. In such cases the actual priority indicated may still be relevant even though
the BCR might experience an upgrading in magnitude through the inclusion of non-economic
benefits, so that a larger number of activities and tasks come out on the positive side. This
could call for more resources to mine action, but nevertheless by withholding the main rank of
priority.
The break-even point is when the BCR is 0. Then benefits will be equal to costs for the given
discount rate, which is set at 10% in this study. A clearance task with a BCR of zero thus
produces just enough benefits to meet its costs at a discount rate of 10%. Lowering the
discount rate would increase the BCR of a project, by assigning more importance to future
benefits.
The discount rate will depend among others on the general level of interest rates in the
country net of the inflation rate, or how people in general value future benefits and losses. In
case a person has the choice between 100 US$ today or 100 US$ in one year, it is expected
that he will choose to have the money now, future benefits would be of less worth to him.
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An individual who is precisely indifferent between having 100 US$ now and 110 US$ in one
year, would recognize that he has a personal discount rate of 10%. Consequently he could
apply this rate to discount future benefits or losses to find what they are worth for him from
today’s point of view, that is to say by calculating their Net Present Value. On similar grounds
it can be assumed that society has its discount rate, which may be different from country to
country and change over time.
A high discount rate (everything else being equal) means that few projects will come out with
a satisfactory BCR. Nevertheless, it is generally wrong to think that projects in the developing
world should be subject to low discount rates. Capital is scarce and competition for funds
should be high among a large number of different uses.
The BCR permits reading directly the percent relation between the benefits and the costs. A
BCR of 0.5 means that the benefits are 50% larger than the costs, with a BCR of 1 the
benefits will be 100% larger than the costs (or 2 times larger) etc.
An alternative evaluation criterion is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The IRR constitutes a
more intuitive measure of gain, by presenting a percentage rate of return on costs, much like
the rate of interest on bank deposits. Generally the IRR is defined as the discount rate which
makes the value of discounted future benefits equal to the costs. The IRR can be compared for
example to the prevailing rate of interest net of inflation in a country.
A discount rate of 10% is being used in this study, and the minimum or break-even IRR
should consequently be in the order of 10%. This will normally correspond to a BCR of zero
as defined above.
The general time-horizon for benefits and costs is in this study set at 20 years. After that time
benefits are considered too uncertain to be reckoned with. Benefits are discounted over 20
years, while all clearance costs normally are assumed to be incurred in the first year.
A main output from the analysis will be a ranking of different clearance tasks or activities in
mine action according to their economic viability measured by their score on the BCR. A
number of assumptions will be made to structure information into some more general cases,
which are presumed to be typical for the areas where mine action is going on, the individual
provinces etc. The validity of such assumptions should be checked, however, when data from
the analysis is applied at specific clearance tasks.
The analysis will be based on available data and statistics mainly from recent years (2000-04),
still unit costs and benefits can to some extent be used for the evaluation of mine action in
earlier periods, with appropriate checking of assumptions. Regular updates will also be
needed when the results from this study are applied at cost benefit analysis of future mine
action activities.
After a shorter discussion (in chapter 2) of the most important social and development issues
of the country, the extent of the mine and Uxo problem in Cambodia is described (in chapter
3). The goals, activities and organisation of the mine action programme are then related
(chapter 4), with among others an assessment of the mine action programme’s main targets
and achievements (chapter 4.3).
The report then proceeds to explore the different elements entering into the cost benefit
analysis of mine action. The first aspect is the humanitarian, the effect of mine action towards
reducing the number of mine and Uxo casualties and the risk of accidents (chapter 5). The
evaluation of the gains is here based on the productive contribution of a typical mine/Uxo
victim over his/her lifetime. The resulting figures should in no case be conceived of as the
value of a human life. Other factors which are more difficult to quantify could certainly play a
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role when considering the humanitarian aspect of mine action. Still the approach is consistent
with standard methodology for the evaluation of reduced accident risk in other sectors like
road safety.
Another main component of a mine action programme is the clearance activity aimed at social
and economic development, reopening access to productive areas, to infrastructure and other
facilities and resources (chapter 6). These activities must also take into account the poverty
reduction and social security aspects of development. The issues addressed here comprise
clearance for agricultural purposes, mine and Uxo contamination of irrigation canals, roads,
school premises, water supply, historic and cultural sites including temple areas, public
buildings etc.
The cost side of the mine action activity will be considered (chapter 7), covering both the
direct resource use for clearance and operations, and the more indirect expenses linked to
planning and administration of the programme. In principle all input of resources to the
programme should be comprised, including donations and gifts.
The benefit and the cost side will then be compared and balanced (chapter 8) in order to
evaluate the economic viability of different tasks and cases, and to provide guidelines for
prioritisation and recommendations on strategies in mine action. In this evaluation the
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) will be used extensively, and to some extent also the Internal Rate
of Return.
The methodology developed will then be applied to evaluate the achievements of the
Cambodian mine action programme in total (chapter 9). This evaluation will be conducted for
a recent year (2003), as information is scarcer for the earlier periods.
The mine action programme’s contributions to achieve the objectives of the country’s poverty
reduction strategy and to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) will then be
assessed (chapter 10). The main part of the report ends with a summary of important
conclusions and recommendations (chapter 11).
On basis of the methodology and data presented the report proceeds with working out some
specific tools for planning purposes that can be applied at future evaluation and prioritisation
of clearance tasks in mine action (Annex 1). The objective is to devise a mechanism, based on
cost-benefit methodology, to assess the socio-economic and poverty reduction impact of
future mine action operations.
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2. Social and economic context
2.1 The country and the people
The population of Cambodia is about 13.5 million, comprising for a large part rural
fishermen, farmers, and artisans living in 2.2 million households, about 85% of the people
live in rural areas. The majority of the people live in fairly permanent villages near the major
bodies of water in the Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands region. About 90 percent of the
population is ethnic Khmer. The remaining 5-10 percent include Chinese-Khmer, Khmer
Islam or Chams, ethnic hill-tribe people, known as the Khmer Loeu, and Vietnamese.
Agriculture is the most important sector, accounting for 33% of GDP, and employing about
70 percent of the labour force, but between 12% and 15% of these have no agricultural land.
Many households are female headed, 19% in rural areas and 25% in the capital Phnom Penh.
This is partly an effect of the wars, resulting in a surplus of women in certain age-groups.
Among the ASEAN countries Cambodia currently has the next highest population growth
with 2.49%, being surpassed only by Laos. The fertility rate is high, and highest among poor
people. At the same time the country has experienced a substantial fertility decline since the
1960s. 3
Cambodia is not densely populated by South-East Asian standards. Still, much of the
population is concentrated in the plains region, where pressure on land is very high. Access to
adequate land is a widespread problem because significant areas are inaccessible, unsuited to
cultivation, remain contaminated by landmines and Uxo, and because land ownership is
unequal. As a result, over 14 per cent of rural households are landless. In addition, common
pool resources such as forests and riverine areas are central to the livelihoods of the majority
of rural Cambodians, while many such areas have been taken by powerful individuals and
converted to logging concessions, plantations, or commercial development.
Because of its multiple regime changes and in particular the severe policies of the Khmer
Rouge to create an egalitarian society, Cambodia’s land problems are particularly acute.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, entire families were wiped-out, and
different groups obtained overlapping claims to the same land or its resources. Almost onethird of the households covered by the 1998 census reported that they had previously resided
outside their place of enumeration. Many reasons for this migration were reported, with
almost 14 per cent citing ‘repatriation/return after displacement’. This latter group is
particularly likely to be landless.
In an effort to address such problems, governments in the late 1980s-early 1990s issued a
series of decrees allowing the issue of legal titles to those who needed land, often on a firstcome, first-serve basis. Well-placed officials, senior military officers, and others in the elite
were often first in line, but the majority of claims, from vulnerable groups such as womenheaded households, indigenous peoples, returnees and displaced people, and demobilised
soldiers, found themselves hostage to the shortcomings in the systems to administer these
provisions. At least one million claimants did not receive land.
Efforts to address these post-clearance land use concerns led to the formation of the Land Use
Planning Units (LUPU), which appear to have prevented the worst abuses. But the
government’s inability to deal with the broader land management issues led to the widespread
eruption of protest demonstrations in the late 1990s. Local and international NGOs initiated a
campaign for land reform, which led to a new land act in 2001. This new law also contains a
3

Royal Government of Cambodia (2003): National Population Policy, page ii.
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programme for distribution of unoccupied state land via social concessions and established
provincial land dispute commissions. 4
Labour force is growing rapidly (2.6%) with more than 200,000 new entrants into the labour
market every year. About 35% of the workers are employed in more than one job. From 1998
to 2000 the average growth in agricultural employment was only 1.6%. Employment in the
secondary and tertiary sectors was limited, while industrial growth was substantial with 43%.
Still this benefited only about 8% of the population. 5
About 46% of the labour force describes themselves as unpaid family workers. A significant
percentage of women, 20 percent in Phnom Penh and 68 percent in rural areas, are unpaid
family workers while the corresponding indicator for men is considerably lower (6% in
Phnom Penh and 30% in rural areas).
The production of rice for household consumption and domestic trade is the major economic
output for most of the rural population. Households supplement rice production with other
economic activities such as fishing, vegetable and fruit production, gathering of forest
products, and off-farm employment.
Since 1993, the Cambodian government has implemented social, economic and legal reforms,
and improved its support for private-sector led economic growth and trade development. One
of the most significant changes has been the progress made in transitioning from a centrallyplanned economy to a competitive market economy. Still the country suffers from few
professional managers or skilled technicians, an undeveloped financial system, and few valueadded products and services to promote international trade. 6
Cambodia staged aggressive economic growth between 1993 and 1996, but ongoing civil
strife, domestic political instability, the Asian financial crisis, and the failure of the
government to implement necessary policy and legal reforms sharply slowed down economic
activities and foreign investment. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was in 1998
estimated to US$ 252, compared to the 1995 level of US$ 321. The estimate for 2002 is US$
296 per capita.

4

Paterson and Vanna (2004): A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action, Case Study of Cambodia
(GICHD September 2004) page 59.
5
Kingdom of Cambodia (20 Dec 2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, page iii.
6
Source: WB/MIME (2003): Cambodia Renewable Energy Action Plan (1994-2000).
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Figure 2.1: Growth rates in GDP per capita, Cambodia 1994-2002.
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Source: National Institute of Statistics: Cambodia Year Book 2003.

Garments and footwear industries now contribute more than 90 percent of total exports and
has been the main engine of growth over the last years, especially since the granting of Most
Favoured Nation status and preferences by the USA in 1996-97. Still the further prospects for
development of this sector are not evident, since competition from neighbouring countries has
increased. The government’s policy is therefore to diversify, in particular into the tourist
industry, a trade which has experienced both growth and setbacks over the latest years.
Agricultural production, especially rice production, has responded well to extensive technical
support by donors and incentives set by government agencies. During 1998/99 to 2001/02
Cambodia produced rice surpluses ranging from 30,000 to 350,000 tonnes. Still this did not
eliminate the food shortage in some parts of the country.
Wood and rubber products, mostly in raw form, are exported primarily by regional traders.
These products represent between three and four percent of Cambodia's export trade. Crossborder smuggling is a continuous and overwhelming problem.
Price inflation, based on the Cambodian reil, has been reduced from triple digits in late 1980s
to less than one percent in 2000. Throughout most of Cambodia, the US dollar and the local
currency co-exist in commercial transactions.
The central objective of the government’s policy is to promote broad-based sustainable
economic growth with equity, and with the private sector playing the leading role. Economic
growth is considered central to the promotion of income opportunities to the poor. 7

2.2 Poverty reduction
In Cambodia 36% of the population lives in absolute poverty, lacking the necessary minimum
level of 2100 calories per person per day. The poverty aspect has many aspects: Lack of food,
half of all children aged 0-5 years are either stunted or underweight, uncertainties about
access to natural resources, lack of power, social exclusion, and lack of education are all
dimensions of poverty.

7
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Only 27 out of 1000 school children manage to complete upper secondary school, and not
more than 37% of Cambodians are functionally literate. In 1999 it was reported that 30% had
never attended school. 8
The country has the lowest health service utilisation in the world. Infant and maternal
mortality rates have declined in recent years, but still remain among the highest in the region.
Life expectancy at birth is 56 years. Most Cambodians lack access to safe water and
sanitation, less than a third of the rural population has access to clean drinking water, while
only about 10% are covered by environmental sanitation. Still the proportion of people living
below the poverty line fell from 39% in 1993/94 to 36% in 1998, in rural areas the share fell
from 43% to 40%.
Rural development is essential to alleviate national poverty, since the vast majority or 85% of
Cambodians lives in rural areas. Development of the agricultural sector, which provides
employment to 70% of the population and contributes about 45% of the GDP, will play a
major role here. Better access for rural people to employment and basic infrastructure will
also contribute to prevent excessive migration to the urban areas, which is a main cause of
poverty there.
Livelihood systems are not secure for most rural communities, which comprise predominantly
subsistence farmers. An estimated 60 % of the households there suffer from food deficits.
Some villages have access to areas of good forest and are able to forage and hunt, or collect
timber and non-timber forest products for immediate household consumption or sale. Others
are able to supplement food crops with fish, but, in general, life is extremely difficult. Food
stocks can begin running out for many families as early as four months after harvest.
Around 50% of the villages have 40-60 % of the households living below the official poverty
line. Household savings are normally held in the form of assets such as livestock and land.
These assets are often lost through forced sale due to economic shock such as serious health
problems in families. Average household incomes vary widely, but the majority in the rural
areas range from US$ 300 to 700 per annum. With an average family size of just over five in
rural households, this equates to an annual per capita income of between US$ 60 and 140.
Through its National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) 2003-2005 the Government is
committed to reducing poverty and inequality and to improve the quality of life for the
population of the country. The NPRS considers landmines as one of the main obstacles
preventing the poor from access to agricultural lands, creating vulnerability. Mine action is
therefore a top priority in rehabilitation and development, in particular for achieving effective
poverty reduction in rural areas.
The Poverty Reduction and Mine Actions Strategies state that mine action can contribute to
poverty reduction by:
–

Reducing the number of casualties which have negative economic consequences for
affected families;
– Providing access for the worst-affected communities to essential services and
infrastructure such as water resources, schools, hospitals and roads;
– Distributing safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes, contributing to the
economic reintegration of landless populations in rural areas;
– Marking contaminated areas and educating and raising awareness as to the dangers of
landmines and Uxo among the population of suspected areas;

8
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–

Ensuring that the prioritisation and distribution of cleared land are monitored in a
participatory, equitable and pro-poor manner at the provincial level;
– Providing assistance to the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims of land mines
and UXO and their affected communities. 9

2.3 The Ottawa Convention
The Kingdom of Cambodia is committed to the Ottawa Convention on the ban of landmines,
the government became a signatory in December 1997. Cambodia is thus a state party to the
Anti Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) to enforce national legislation banning the
production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines.
The member states are committed to take steps consistent with the Convention's core
humanitarian aims: to clear mined areas, assist victims, and universalise the ban on antipersonnel mines. Each year the government is obliged to report on the implementation of the
treaty in Cambodia to the Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBT.
The Ottawa Convention stipulates among others the following:
“Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines
in areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after
the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” (Article 5, paragraph 1).
This is a commitment with serious consequences for Cambodia given the extensive amount of
suspected mined areas registered there. Still “if a State Party believes that it will be unable to
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within
that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review
Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such antipersonnel mines, for a period of up to ten years” (Article 5, paragraph 5).

2.4 The Millennium Development Goals
The Millennium Declaration was adopted in September 2000 by all 180 member states of the
UN. World leaders here agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable goals for combating
extreme poverty, hunger, diseases, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination
against women, called the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The Government of
Cambodia has signed this declaration, because it is consistent with its long term commitment
to improve living conditions and reduce poverty. 10
Recognising the large negative impact of mines on the livelihood of people living in rural
areas, mine action is considered one of the top priorities for the country’s rehabilitation and
development. The government is further strongly committed to implement the Ottawa
Convention. De-mining, Uxo and Victims Assistance have therefore been introduced as Goal
number 9 in the MDG Report 2003.
In compliance with its obligations towards the Ottawa convention the MDG 9 sets a target to
move towards zero impact from landmines and Uxo in 2012. The annual number of civilian
casualties will then have to be reduced to 0, and all suspected areas cleared. It is admitted,

9

National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.5.5 and CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy
2004, chapter 4.2.2.
10
Kingdom of Cambodia (2003): Cambodia Millennium Development Goals Report 2003, page 9.
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however, that this may be difficult to achieve. Other actions consist of developing a victim
assistance framework. 11
Still, mine action, and in particular area clearance may also have impact for other MDGs:
–

Clearance of areas that can be reclaimed for agricultural production can have
strong impacts for MDG 1- Overall target 2, concerned with reducing the
proportion of people suffering from hunger.

–

De-mining school premises can contribute to fulfilling MDG 2- Overall target 3,
aiming at improving the education system so that more children can be able to
complete school.

–

Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide access to rural health
stations, which are much needed in the fight against the spread of diseases like
HIV/AIDS and malaria (MDG 6) and to reduce child mortality (MDG 4) and
maternal mortality (MGD 5).

–

Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells could have a direct impact on
MDG 7- Overall target 14, addressing the problem of improved access to safe
drinking water.

–

Clearance of areas for resettlement, with a transparent and equitable system for
redistribution of the land, will in general also be important for MDG 7- Overall
target 16, to improve the access to land security.

More specific measures for the achievements of these goals have been worked out in chapter
10 of this report.

11
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3. Mines and Uxo in Cambodia
3.1 Contamination
The later 35 years of conflict has left Cambodia one of the world’s most heavily mine- and
Uxo-contaminated nations. The Level One Survey (L1S) measuring the impact of mines/UXO
in the entire country was completed in April 2002. Here it was indicated 3,037 suspected
areas, amounting to 4,466 km² that could be contaminated by mines or Uxo. This represents
2.5 % of the country's surface area.
According to the L1S about 1,640 villages, i.e. approximately 12 % of all, have to cope with
high contamination by landmines and Uxo, and more than 5,500 have Uxo scattered on their
land. About 60% of the mine-suspected areas are concentrated in the five provinces of
Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Odtar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Pailin in the northwestern and northern regions of the country. More than 11,000 explosive ordnance disposal
tasks were recorded.

Figure 3.1: Mine and Uxo contamination in Cambodia. Source CMAA 12
The mine/Uxo contamination in the country as registered in L1S can be broken down by
province, with high level of contamination in 7 provinces, moderate level in 9, and low level
in 8 provinces.
However, it should be noted that due to the nature of technical requirements and
methodology, the L1S could not have measured the precise size of the affected areas or the
scope of the contamination. There are indications both that L1S may have exaggerated the
contamination in some places and that there may be contaminated areas also outside the L1S
areas. A study of minefields cleared by the operators in 2003 shows that only 64% of them
12

Source: CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, chapter 1.2.3.
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were included in one of the suspected mined areas listed in the L1S, 36% of cleared areas
were thus outside the L1S. 13
On the other hand, huge suspected surface areas do not need a very urgent clearance; since
they are located in very remote parts of the country, without population and no fertile land, as
it is the case in the north of the Siem Reap province. So the L1S data has to be updated
regularly and checked by national competent authorities and demining operators, in order to
provide valuable information.
In the absence of accurate information on the size of the mine-contaminated area, CMAA has
used a proportion amounting to 10% 14 of the L1S estimates as a planning figure to determine
the scope of contamination in the country, which means that the current contaminated area
could comprise about 425 km2 in total. 15 Contaminated areas identified by the operating
agencies (HALO and CMAC) and classified as of high priority, amount to about 260 km2 in
2004. 16

3.2 Human loss
Between January 1979 and December 2003, Cambodia suffered a total of over 60,000
mine/Uxo casualties. Despite the relatively large volume of de-mining operations, the level of
contamination and the number of civilian accidents continue to be among the highest in the
world, indicating the extraordinarily high level of contamination in the country as a result of
decades of conflict. In the year 2003 there were 772 and in 2004 a total of 891 people reported
as direct victims of accidents by mines or Uxo.
Figure 3.2: Mine and Uxo casualties in Cambodia 1979-2002
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Source: CMVIS: National Census of the victims & survivors of landmines and unexploded ordnance in
Cambodia.
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Of the mine/UXO casualties recorded for the years 1979-2003, about 30% died and 70% have
suffered non-fatal injuries, i.e. about 40,000. Many of these victims have been maimed and
are now disabled, having suffered grave injuries as amputation, burns, blindness or paralysis.
In the earlier years records were less complete and accurate, but civilian casualties peaked at
1700-1800 per year from 1993-96, falling to about 1300 per year until the end of hostilities in
late 1998, then dropping again to about 800 per year, with 830 in 2002 and 772 in 2003, while
the year 2004 experienced a significant leap to 891.
Figure 3.3: Civilian casualties annually (military personnel excluded)
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Still, from 2000 on the number of accidents caused by mines decreased steadily from 443 to
341 in 2004. Unfortunately this was accompanied by an increasing trend of Uxo casualties,
from 389 in the year 2000 to 550 in 2004, with a leap of 140 in 2004 alone, so that Uxo
casualties now constitute well over 50% of the victims. The policy targets in Figure 3.3 of 500
victims in 2005, 250 in 2010 and 0 in 2012 are reflected in the Cambodian National Mine
Action Strategy and the Millennium Development Goals, and are designed to comply with the
Ottawa Convention.

17

CMVIS (2003): National Census
Source for Targets 2005-12: CMAA (2004): National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 3.1 and Cambodia
Millennium Development Goals November 2003) table 2.9.1.
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Figure 3.4: Mine and Uxo casualties January 2003 to May 2004 (source CMAA).
The geographical distribution of mine and Uxo victims in Cambodia (Figure 3.4) shows a
marked concentration on the regions to the north-west, on the border with Thailand. There are
also incidents elsewhere, in the central parts of the country and towards the border with
Vietnam in the south-east. A remarkable feature is the few incidents reported from the east
and north-east, the regions bordering Laos and Vietnam. These parts of the country were
heavily bombarded during the Vietnam War and must contain large amounts of mines and
Uxos. An explanation could be that the sparse population of these regions generate few
accidents, but there is also a possibility of under-reporting because of lack of inspection and
communication. The deficient road system discourages people and officials from travelling
there.
All provinces and municipalities have been concerned with mine accidents in 2002 or 2003,
except Phnom Penh and Kep, i.e. 22 out of 24, among these eight had less than one mine
accident a month. 19 In 2004 the Battambang province experienced an average of about 10
mine casualties per month, Banteay Meanchey had 8 and Pailin 4.
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Battambang province suffered more than 12 MA per month, or 3 MA per week, in 2002. In 2003, 6 MA with
UXO injured 26 people in Kandal province.
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Table 3.1: Victims’ activity at the time of mine and Uxo incident (year 2002-2003)
Tampering with mine/Uxo
Bystander
Travelling
Farming
Collecting wood
Collecting food
Clearing new land
Burning
Herding
Demining
Military activity
Construction
Fishing
Playing
Other
Total
Source: CMVIS National Census

Mine
5%
3%
29 %
21 %
21 %
7%
5%
1%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
0%
2%
100 %

Uxo
59 %
18 %
1%
7%
1%
1%
3%
2%
2%
0%
0%
0%
1%
1%
4%
100 %

Mine and Uxo accidents follow separate patterns: In 2002/2003 about 70% of the mine
victims were exposed to accidents while travelling, doing farm work or collecting wood,
whereas 59% of the Uxo victims were tampering with the Uxo, with another 18% standing by
as lookers on.
Uxo incidents tend to result in more casualties than mine accidents. Statistics from 2002 show
that 10 mine incidents caused 13 casualties on the average, while as much as 18 persons could
be injured in 10 Uxo incidents. In 2003 these rates had increased to 15 persons at 10 mine
incidents and 20 persons at 10 Uxo incidents.
Table 3.2: Age and gender of mine and Uxo victims (year 2002-2003)
Mine
Men
80 %
Boys
11 %
Women
7%
Girls
2%
Total
100 %
Source: CMVIS National Census

Uxo
42 %
43 %
5%
10 %
100 %

Total
59 %
29 %
6%
6%
100 %

Males are much more frequently exposed to mine and Uxo accidents then females. Men and
boys constituted 88% of the total number of casualties in 2002-2003. At mine accidents 80%
of the victims are men 11% boys. Uxo incidents, however, involve just as many boys (43%)
as men (42%), while girls fall victims (10%) presumably because standing among the lookers
on.
Increasing numbers of Uxo victims are now found scattered in almost all provinces.
Investigations carried out by the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and Handicap International of
Belgium (HI), show that insufficient information about the danger of explosive devices has
been disseminated in the villages where accidents happened. Individuals tampering with Uxos
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and lookers on comprise almost half of the casualties. 20 If it had not been for that tampering
of mine/Uxo and on-looking people around, about 330 casualties would have been avoided in
2003 which is almost half the casualties that year. 21
In Cambodia there is regularly a trend towards high numbers of mine and Uxo casualties in
the beginning of the year, coinciding with the dry season when villagers are roaming the
forests in search of food and fuelwood. Most provinces experience lower levels of accidents
in the wet season from May to November.
The death rate among mine and Uxo victims is now (2002-2003) about 16% and the same for
both categories of accidents. Additionally 23% of the victims have to undergo amputations
while 61% are classified as injured.
Table 3.3: Place of accident
Mine
50 %
4%
10 %
6%
12 %
4%
5%
3%
3%
3%
100 %

In forest
In village
Rice field
Near river
On path
Grazing field
On mountain/hill
Near military position
On road
Other

Uxo
14 %
41 %
16 %
12 %
3%
6%
1%
3%
0%
3%
100 %

Source: CMVIS National Census

Forests seem to be dangerous places as 50% of the mine casualties report to have fallen
victims there. As regards the Uxo casualties, the largest part of the accidents takes place in the
village. However, a concept of the real threat represented by different locations or types of
areas could only be established if the number of accidents was related to the total extent of the
mined/ Uxo infested areas of these categories.

3.3
Blocking infrastructure
In Cambodia poor households are forced to take risks with mines/Uxo because of economic
necessity. Families could face starvation if they were not willing to take risks, farming land
that may be contaminated or gathering forest produce. About 2,300 villages have reported
restricted access to neighboring communities, while significant numbers of villages reported
restricted access to pagodas (1,487 villages), markets (1,334), health centers (1,312), and
schools (affecting about 44,000 students).

20
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CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, Executive Summary.
CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, chapter 1.3.3.3.
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The mines/Uxos had severe impact on the villagers 22:
–
–
–
–
–
–

Not enough agricultural land 22%
High number of human casualties 19%
Gathering activities affected 18%
Not enough housing land 15%,
Experienced loss of livestock 14%
Difficult water access 12%.

The most common constraints reported were as follows 23:
Restricted access to:
Agricultural land
Forests
Pasture land
Water sources

Number of suspected areas
2,077
2,000
1,781
1,184

22

Number of families affected
102,778
172,878
105,707
84,588

Level One Survey, referred in CMAC: Annual Report 2003, page 2.
Source: CMAA Level One Survey (L1S) referred in Paterson and Vanna (2004): A Study of Capacity
Development in Mine Action, Case Study of Cambodia (GICHD September 2004) page 20.
23

18

4. The mine action programme
4.1 Visions and planning strategies
Mine action is considered by the RGC as one of the top priorities for rehabilitation and
development of the country. It has been fully integrated among Cambodia’s Millennium
Development Goals and in its Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS).
The long-term mission for mine action in Cambodia is, according to the National Mine Action
Strategy 2004 (NMAS), to eliminate as soon as possible the risk of death or injury to
individuals living in mined areas, to significantly reduce the negative socio-economic impact
of landmines/ UXO on the population while achieving humanitarian and national development
goals, in order to ensure the prioritisation for poor people and the rehabilitation and welfare of
landmine victims in society and to comply with the international conventions on mine
action. 24
For the foreseeable future, the primary focus of the mine action sector in Cambodia will most
likely remain humanitarian in nature e.g. clearing mines and UXO to reduce the risks to human
life. The humanitarian imperative has been and will stay the raison d’être of mine action. 25
The National Mine Action Strategy comprises the following visions 26:
− The medium-term vision is to move towards zero impact from land mines and UXO by
2012, in order to enhance security, alleviate poverty and to sustain development, as
ensured by clearing all severe/high risk suspected mined areas and developing
intensive mine risk education for the medium and low suspected areas with mines and
UXO.
− The long-term vision is to have a Cambodia free from the negative humanitarian and
socio-economic impacts of landmines/ UXO by 2020 by sustaining a national
capability to address the problem in non-cleared and remote areas from 2012.
The strategy is to clear the worst-affected areas to reduce as soon as possible to a negligible
and nationally acceptable level, the risk of death or injury to individuals living in landmine/
Uxo-affected parts of the country, where access is denied to critical life-dependent resources,
such as water and food crops for which there are no viable alternatives. This reducing of the
impact of mines/Uxo will be carried out as quickly as possible by increasing outputs coupled
with improved targeting of most affected areas. 27

4.2 Clearance activities
Mine action activities in Cambodia began during the United Nations Transitional Authority of
Cambodia (UNTAC) era in 1992 with international technical and financial support. From
1992 to December 2003 the various mine clearance operators had cleared a total area of 252
km2. Figure 4.1 includes the areas reported from all the certified mine clearance agencies. 28
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CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 5.
CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.
26
CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 2.
27
CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.1.
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Actually CMAC, HALO Trust, MAG, RCAF, but other agencies were involved in earlier years.
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Figure 4.1: Areas cleared (ha) 1992-2003 and the mine action work plan for 2004.

Source: CMAA 29

Currently, four main operators are involved in mine and UXO clearance: CMAC the national
governmental operator, the international agencies HALO Trust and MAG, which constitute
the 3 civilian operators, and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF)/Engineering
Command Force.
Parts of the areas reported by the RCAF are presumed to be combined survey and clearance of
roads in support of rehabilitation works. Far higher rates of productivity are normal for such
combined survey/clearance tasks, as most of the area is not in fact contaminated. RCAF
reported exceptional clearance activity in the years 2000, 2002 and 2003.
An important task of mine clearance was carried out in the south of the province of Siem
Reap from 1992 on, to give access to the main historical and religious site in the Kingdom of
Cambodia, the Angkor area.
In addition to the reduction of the human loss, a main goal for the mine action programme in
Cambodia is to prioritise mined land for clearance according to socio-economic needs at the
local level. Safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes will be distributed, contributing
to the economic reintegration of landless populations in rural areas, and communities will be
provided with access to essential services and infrastructure such as water resources, schools,
hospitals and roads.
The mine action strategy thus distinguishes between clearance of severely mined villages with
high levels of casualties, and providing access to productive land improving the living
conditions for poor people, de-mining of specific areas such as historical sites to promote
development of the tourist industry, or clearing infrastructure such as roads allowing
communication with other parts of the country. The programme aims at putting in place a
community based, transparent, participative and decentralized process to identify those
villages, families and persons that will be entitled to receive cleared lands.
29

CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, chapter 2.2.1.
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Figure 4.2: Areas cleared by civilian agencies in 2003.
Figure 4.2 provides a distribution of the areas cleared in 2003 by types of land. The large
majority, 65% of the clearance, is connected with agriculture and resettlement schemes of
displaced people. Roads make up a significant proportion (19% and 313 km) and the
remaining areas are clearance tasks connected to specific locations, public buildings, water
supply, irrigation canals, temple areas etc. 30
The figures include only the civilian operators (CMAC, HALO, MAG) and their clearance of
16.5 km2. Distribution on types of areas has not been obtained from RCAF, which activities
comprised 24.4 km2 in 2003. The total area cleared in 2003 was thus 40.9 km2, which should
be the largest annual achievement ever in mine action in Cambodia.
The National Work Plan for 2004 comprises (without RCAF) clearance of the following
areas 31:
– Agriculture: 550 ha
– Resettlement: 426 ha
– Agriculture and resettlement: 193 ha.
– Casualty reduction: 105 ha.
– Wells, ponds: 14 tasks.
– Canals: 11 tasks.
– Roads: 91 tasks, 29 km.
– Bridges: 1 task.
– Schools: 41 tasks.
– Health centres: 5 tasks.
– Commune offices: 6 tasks.
– Other: 19 tasks.
This amounts to an area of 19.9 km2 and with a contribution from RCAF of 9.7 km2, the area
planned for clearance in 2004 comprises 29.6 km2 in total. 32
30

Areas related to these clearance tasks have been estimated since the statistics mainly gives the number of
tasks.
31
CMAA (2004): Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.2.3.

21

4.3 Assessment of targets and achievements
Concerning casualties, the RGC is firmly committed towards zero impact from landmines and
Uxo by 2012 as per pledges in the Ottawa Convention. A target of less than 280 civilian
casualties has consequently to be reached in 2008 in order to be near zero in 2012. Based on a
straightforward linear projection, however, the target for the number of casualties can hardly
be met as foreseen. Indeed, despite of a reassuring decrease in 2003, an unexpected increase
of civilian casualties occurred in 2004. 33
On mine clearance, the RGC is committed to ensure that at least 65% of the suspected areas
will be cleared by the end of 2008 in order to have 100% of the suspected mined areas cleared
by 2015. This is based, of course, on an assumption that the suspected, dangerous areas can be
properly identified and duly targeted. The clearance targets are now based on the CMAA
estimate that only 10% of the L1S areas are contaminated and have to be cleared. After this
reduction, the objective of mine clearance pertains to about 425 km2.
To reach this target an average of at least 30 km2 must be cleared every year as of 2003. This
could be met given the actual capacity of the 4 participating clearance agencies, the problem
is, however, that a large part of their clearance activity, as much as 36% in 2003, is conducted
outside the designated (L1S) areas. It can actually be claimed that an important percentage of
the clearance achieved should not be taken into account in the calculations since it has not
been implemented in L1S’s suspected mined area. 34
In 2003 about 36% of cleared areas were outside the L1S. 35 At the same time it is clear that
L1S also failed to take into account important contaminated area. One explanation of the lack
of coverage is that parts of some provinces were not populated at the time when the L1S team
undertook its survey activities (year 2000-2002), and large scale population movements have
been going on since.
A slight increase in the annual clearance rate has been achieved over the last years, but despite
this positive trend and even if the assumption of having only 10% of the L1S area
contaminated is right, it is not sure that the target will be reached in 2015. The situation could
demand an increase in the current clearance capacity.36
Realistically it is anticipated that mine action operations will need to continue at a persistent
and even reinforced level at least until 2020. Sustainable efforts will have to be maintained in
clearance and mine risk education, especially for Uxo. Even beyond this period a reduced
capability will probably be needed, with smaller and mobile de-mining teams to deal with
specific clearance tasks and numerous Uxo, possibly for as long as a further 50 years. 37
In order to fulfil the goals immediate priority should be given to those areas which produce
largest effect towards reducing the number of casualties. This will of course depend on the
application of efficient planning tools including identification and prioritization mechanisms
at the local level, by CMAA, the operators and the donors. CMAA has applied a set of criteria
to measure the socio economic impact that mines/Uxo have on communities, ranking villages
based on their impact score 38 and grouping them into categories. This exercise has been
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CMAA (2004): Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.1.1.
CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 4.1.2.
34
CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 4.1.2.
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CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 1.3.
36
CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 4.1.
37
CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 1.2.
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Score is based on three major impact factors; the number of recent victims, the facilities and livelihood areas
to which mines block access, and the type of contamination.
33
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conducted on the suspected 425 km2 to distribute the area on the impact categories “severe,
high, medium and low” and geographically on provinces. 39
The Five Year Plan assumes that priority is given to clear severe and high impact areas before
medium and low in order to alleviate the casualty rate.40 A total of about 300 km2 are thus
presumably causing the main part of the above mentioned accidents problems and will
consequently be attended to first.
The problem with this reduced area is, however, the same as with the total L1S area: It cannot
be claimed to cover the total suspected area in the country. In total it may not exaggerate the
extent of the priority contaminated area, but it is still a fact that considerable amounts of
clearance activities are going on at the outside. Data from the operators (HALO and CMAC)
indicate high-priority mined areas amounting to about 260 km2 as of 2004, 41 and comparison
between the CMAA priority area and the operators’ data reveals a rather different distribution
on provinces as shown in table 4.1.

Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kracheh
Preah Vihear
Others
Total

CMAA severe
and high categories
96.2
51.5
41.9
28.1
27.8
18.2
4.3
6.9
1.7
2.2
1.1
22.8
302.8

Operators
data
46.0
2.7
51.1
41.6
75.9
2.3
3.1
20.1
2.6
0.0
18.5
0.0
263.8

CBA
estimate
72.2
38.6
38.3
31.2
56.9
13.7
3.2
15.0
1.9
1.7
13.9
17.1
303.7

Table 4.1: Priority contaminated area in km2, information from CMAA and the operators.
The operators have identified considerably more contaminated areas in provinces like Preah
Vihear, Kampong Cham, Banteay Meanchey, Odtar Meanchey and Siem Reap than the L1S
based CMAA estimate on severe and high impact areas. Provinces like Battambang, Pursat
and Pailin have on the other hand much less priority mined area in the data from the operators
compared to the CMAA estimates.
In a recent report (Griffin and Keeley 2004) the mine/Uxo contamination in Cambodia has
been assessed based on information of the L1S, US bombing records, land cover mapping,
areas already cleared etc. Suspected areas are consecutively reduced to a total of about 450
km2, indicated as the total likely area contaminated agricultural ground with economic value.
It is also stated that further reductions may be possible. 42
It is strongly recommended to revise the L1S estimate of contaminated area. The mapping
tools already at disposal with CMAA combined with the scheduled reinforcement of the
planning capacity at the local level (see chapter 4.4.2) should improve the possibility of
conducting this appraisal. Area revisions should also to a greater extent than the L1S take into
39

CMAA (2004): Five Year Mine Action Plan 2004-2008, chapter 3.1.1
CMAA (2004): Five Year Mine Action Plan 2004-2008, chapter 3.1.3.
41
Source: National Mine Action Database
42
Griffin and Keeley (December 2004): Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia, page 10 and Annex 2.1.
40
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account information also from the operators, while such data may not always give the
complete picture.
Clearance of mine and Uxo contaminated areas constitutes together with mine risk education
the principal action parameters of a mine action programme. As an important input to this cost
benefit analysis there will be a need for some estimate of the total priority area to be cleared
in the country. The cost benefit analysis should also to the largest possible extent be
conducted at a disaggregated level, targeting the provinces in the first instant.
Based on the afore mentioned factors the CBA proposes a preliminary estimate of the high
priority contaminated land, consisting of the CMAA/L1S severe and high priority categories
for the provinces where these constitute the largest area and the data from the operators for
the provinces where these are found to be the most extensive. Finally these estimates are
reduced with 25% so as to comply with the CMAA/L1S appraisal that there are about 300
km2 of severe and high priority contaminated areas in the country. The distribution of this
area on provinces will, however, be different in the CBA estimate both from CMAA/L1S and
the operators’ data (table 4.1).
The CBA estimate thus attempts to take into account the fact that the L1S estimate could fail
to target contaminated areas at some locations, while the operators also may fall short of
recognising areas, particularly in regions where they have no activity.
In the further analysis (see chapter 5) this area will be considered as a principal source of the
mine and (partially) the Uxo accidents in the country. It must, however, be realised that this
estimate is subject to shortcomings, and better ones could easily be plugged into the analysis
as soon as they become available.
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Province
Battambang

Pursat

Siem Reap

Otdar Meanchey

Banteay Meanchey

Pailin

Kampong Cham

Preah Vihear

Total
Total victims
Total clearance (ha)

Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Clearance (ha)
Mine victims
Uxo victims
Mine victims
Uxo victims

2000

2001

2002

2003

442
180
78
1
15
25
139
10
32
210
41
25
419
110
12
4
47
16
25
0
29
53
15
52
443
389
832
3225

393
148
58
7
13
16
189
13
21
375
37
31
354
105
28
73
40
17
1
12
37
23
17
35
434
390
824
2188

353
105
81
114
8
12
182
6
43
398
37
41
320
110
25
150
54
8
7
8
70
75
25
40
366
475
841
3483

310
109
60
150
17
15
107
6
49
224
54
43
231
87
33
70
55
24
5
10
28
75
10
31
362
410
772
4177

2004

Total clearance
1992-2003
3277

129
122
312
15
24
1813
3
16
1229
27
48
3831
98
36
297
50
48
419
4
72
225
10
24
341
550
891
2966 43

Table 4.2: Impact on accidents rates from the clearance of contaminated areas.
Clearance of dangerously contaminated land should have an apparent impact on the accident
rate in the neighbouring areas which were exposed to the risk. Even though many random
factors may influence the accident numbers for an individual year, the effect should be visible
at least when looking at statistics for several following years or through the analysis of a
number of similar cases at different locations and/or periods.
I table 4.2 the clearance activity at the provincial level for the years 2000 to 2003 and during
the whole period 1992-2003 has been related to the recorded casualty rates in the province for
mine and Uxo incidents separately.
Even in the provinces with the highest number of casualties and also the largest amount of
clearance activity, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey, it is difficult to find a clear decreasing
trend in the mine-accident frequency. Battambang definitely experienced a drop in 2000-02,
but the rate is on the increase again especially in 2004.
In Pailin there was no clearance at all recorded before year 2000, but the concentrated effort
over the last 3 years has not resulted in any significant drop in the mine casualty rate. In Preah
43
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Vihear the clearing likewise started in the year 2000 while the accident rate is rather
fluctuating over the later years.
Siem Reap shows more of the pattern one could expect in response to substantial efforts of
clearance activities, but the accident figures are rather small here over the whole period
considered.
For the Uxo accident it is even more difficult to disentangle effects from clearance. In many
provinces it is heavily on the rise despite the clearance activity.
The first objection to the analysis could be to point out the difficulty in telling from the
figures in table 4.2 what the accident rates would have been without any ongoing clearance
activity. They could presumably have been much higher, so that the clearance efforts at least
contributed to mitigate the even more disastrous potential impacts from the contaminated
areas. In some places this might be an explanation, and a more thorough analysis would be
needed to identify where and why this is the case. A consequence would be that substantially
larger clearance efforts are needed in order to reach the agreed on goals for reduction in
casualty rates.
It is by now generally admitted, however, that while the clearance of minefields can
contribute to reduce the number of mine accidents, other measures like mine risk education
will have to be strengthened in order to reduce the number of Uxo casualties.
Nonetheless, it is disconcerting to be able to trace so few clear impacts all over, and the
problem could be that the analysis is conducted on a too high level, district or commune could
be more appropriate. Other time periods could also be selected, for example 1996-2000,
which demonstrates the largest decline in accidents rates in recent years from about 1750 to
800 (figure 3.3). This was apparently also achieved with smaller efforts than have been
deployed later on. The clearance rate of about 20 km2 a year in 1996 was declining to about
16 km2 in 1999, compared with areas between 20 km2 and up to over 40 km2 in recent years.
The variations are smaller, however, when looking at the output for the civilian operators only
(figure 4.1). Such studies could be launched as more detailed and better data becomes
available. 44
In any case the mine action programme in Cambodia is not an exception here. Concrete
studies demonstrating the relation between mine action activities and risk reduction are indeed
very scarce. The GICHD/UNDP Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action states
that “in the case of risk reduction, the study team did not come across a single report that
adequately documents how much the accident rate has fallen due to mine action. While it is
clear that the numbers of landmine and Uxo accidents have fallen in many countries having
mine action programmes, it remains unclear how much of the decline is the result of mine
action.” 45
It is furthermore stated that decline in accident rates may be the outcome of a variety of
factors:
–

people learning to avoid contaminated areas,

–

“spontaneous” declines in risky behaviour,

–

reflecting the end of large population movements caused by conflict and
remigration,

44

The clearance data on provinces used in table 4.2 are not complete, RCAF is lacking, and even the data for the
civilian agencies do not add up correctly to the official amount of clearance undertaken in the period.
45
GICHD/UNDP (2001): A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, page 9.
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in addition to the main action parameters of a programme:
–

clearance of mine- and Uxo infested areas, and

–

mine risk education and awareness.

The lack of specific knowledge of the impact on such factors on the accident frequency and
for the success of mine action programmes in general calls for a more thorough analytical
approach. Studies in this field should, however, be based on experience and data from a
number of countries and cases over an extended period of time.

4.4 Organisation and main stakeholders
4.4.1 National Level
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority (CMAA) was established in
September 2000 placed under the direct leadership of the Prime Minister. CMAA currently
acts as co-ordinator in the mine action sector at the national level, charged with the
implementation of national planning in the mine action sector and with the coordination of
information and communication processes, involving all stakeholders; government, service
providers and donors. Prior to the creation of CMAA and from the start of mine action
in1992, this role was assumed by the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC), which is now
among the service providers for mine action.
According to the decree CMAA is charged with developing policy guidelines and strategic
visions on de-mining and UXO clearance and assistance to mine victims, regulation and
monitoring of activities and accreditation of organisations involved. Its responsibilities also
comprise the development of guidelines on the management of land use on post clearance
etc. 46
CMAA has laid groundwork for coordination by issuing key documents on the assessment of
the contamination problem, a strategy for addressing the problem, and a multi-year action
plan. Still the National Work Plan 2004 is merely an edition of the collected work plans for
the different clearance agencies. 47 This underlines the actual independent role of the clearance
agencies acting together with their different donors, and the Government through RCAF.
Coordination is slight and all the funding for clearance and other operations is channelled
directly to the agencies.
In one important respect, the scope of CMAA extends beyond traditional mine action to
embrace post-clearance land use, one of the most important issues in Cambodia today. Efforts
to address these post-clearance land use concerns led to the formation of land use planning
units at the local level.
4.4.2 Local level participation in planning
The responsibility for the selection of individual mine action tasks will, according to plans, in
the future be handled essentially at the provincial level to ensure compliance with national
priorities and humanitarian purposes. This is consistent with the decentralisation process
promoted by the RGC, and is vital for relevance, success and sustainability of mine action
46

Kingdom of Cambodia: Legal Framework of Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority
CMAA.
47
Principally the civilian agencies, CMAC, HALO, MAG.
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activities. Provincial authorities will act as an interface among de-mining operators,
development NGOs and local authorities, communities and target beneficiaries. 48
As part of sub-national planning, there will be a requirement for mine action activities to be
endorsed by provincial authorities as part of their provincial development plans. Transparent,
nationally owned and provincial-level led mechanisms need to be in place to address preclearance land allocation and post-clearance land use issues through the national regulations
and mechanisms.
Authorities in the most mine-affected provinces set in 1999 up Provincial Sub-Committees
(PSC), chaired by the vice-governor and including a technical support unit, the Land Use
Planning Unit (LUPU). In 2003 a framework more in line with the government’s
decentralisation policies was proposed, introducing new bodies the Provincial Mine Action
Committees (PMAC) and the Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU) at the district level.
The PRDC/LUPU process has been led by provincial authorities in close co-operation with
mine clearance operators, and development agencies. It defines, in advance the number and
the identities of beneficiaries. The process is community based, participative and
decentralized, aimed at identifying in a transparent way those eligible to receive cleared lands.
So far this process has been active and operational in five of the most affected provinces:
Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Pailin.
The LUPU mechanism has worked well and, has reduced the number of incidents in which
land has been seized by powerful interests after clearance or where cleared land lies idle
because of ownership dispute. Still it is clear that not all de-mining agencies take their
priorities from the LUPU process. RCAF responds to requests mainly from national ministries
or provincial governors, working on national priorities determined from the top rather than on
bottom-up priorities identified by communities and development NGOs through the LUPU
process.
Other civilian operators regard the LUPU process as too easily ‘hijacked’ and consult their
own information in addition to the LUPU lists. These operators also have to respond to
requests from their funding donors, which are not always coordinated with the outcomes of
the LUPU process.
The light-handed coordination of mine action can be illustrated by the fact that 36% of the
areas cleared in 2003 by the 3 civilian operators were outside the National Work Plan (NWP),
even though this plan in its conception was a mere juxtaposition of the plans submitted by the
same operators. At the same time 43% of the areas designated in the NWP had not been
cleared by the end of the year. CMAA expresses concern about the difficulties encountered by
all de-mining agencies in the field to follow their work plans, a situation which can create
difficulties to plan at the community level. 49
Due to the transitional situation in 2003 LUPU was not able to provide CMAA with reports
regarding the 2004 NWP. Reports from the provinces are, however, expected received for the
2005 NWP from the new MAPU. 50
4.4.3 Operations level
Mine and Uxo clearance operations within Cambodia are currently operating with a
workforce of some 4000 personnel, with in addition hundreds of others in mine action
48

CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.3.
CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 1.1.1.
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CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 3.2.3.
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operations such as mine risk education across governmental and NGOs institutions. The 4
principal actors in mine and Uxo clearance are CMAC, HALO Trust, MAG and RCAF.
Created in 1992, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) is the government’s mineaction operator. After the turmoil in 1999-2000, which resulted in a new setup of mine action
with policy and regulatory functions clearly separated from implementation, CMAC was
reorganised as a service provider only, with responsibilities for mine/Uxo clearance, survey,
mine risk education, training etc. A new top management team was in-place by 2001, and by
the end of 2003 many former weaknesses had been rectified. CMAC has now a staff in excess
of 2,300.
HALO Trust, an international group, started operations in Cambodia in 1992, undertaking
emergency survey and de-mining. HALO has grown to become the second largest civilian
mine clearance organisation in Cambodia. In line with HALO Trust’s overall philosophy, its
programme concentrates principally on de-mining. HALO expanded rapidly in size from 560
staff in 1999 to 900 in 2001, to reach almost 1,100 personnel today.
The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is an international non-profit NGO, based in the United
Kingdom and operating in Cambodia since 1992. MAG employs about 500 national personnel
at all levels of the organisation, including about 100 women de-miners and about 70 amputee
de-miners.
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) engineering brigades have long been active in
de-mining, but it was not until 1999, shortly after the end of the civil war that they were
accredited as a humanitarian de-mining organisation. The capacity is significant, with over
690 de-miners. Personnel have received equipment and training from Japan, France, China,
and USA as well as from UNTAC.
The commander of the military de-mining units is one of the three deputy secretary generals
of CMAA and RCAF has announced its intention to coordinate more fully with CMAA.
However, RCAF is not yet a full partner within the national mine action programme, and not
all its de-mining activities fall within the policy sphere of CMAA. Information on activities is
scarce, and most CMAA statistics on clearance etc at detailed level is presented without any
contribution from RCAF.
Since at least 2000 RCAF has been active in conducting survey and clearance operations in
support of road construction projects financed in the main by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), putting it in competition with private de-mining firms and, on occasion, with HALO
Trust and CMAC.
Other agencies with local affiliation accredited for de-mining have come to the fore recently
competing for de-mining tasks on the private market, the Khmer Mine Action Service
(KMAS), TADS and MUA.
There is little standardization among the mine/Uxo clearance operators as of the approach to
the tasks, the set-up of field work teams, techniques and types of equipment in use etc. This
makes comparison of quality of services and costs complicated, in combination with the fact
that many of the clients and donors are not too concerned with specifying tasks in a way that
can reveal unit costs of different types of services (clearance tasks, various kinds of areas etc).
A variety of other development non-governmental and international organisations are
involved with mine action in Cambodia, with fund raising, training, assistance etc.
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4.5 Funding
The four operators actually engaged in mine/Uxo clearance under the Cambodian mine action
programme, CMAC, HALO, MAG and RCAF are rather independent, subject to slight
coordination by CMAA. Competition is limited, as there is no regular practice of putting
larger clearance tasks out on tender. Each operator to a large extent benefits from its proper
regular sources for funding, comprising:
–

Bi-lateral funding from the international donor community sometimes through
NGOs (HALO, CMAC, MAG).

–

The multilateral UNDP trust fund (CMAC).

–

The Government of Cambodia (RCAF and CMAC) among others under its budget
for agriculture.

The funding comprises direct payment for specific assignments in area clearance, mine risk
education etc, as well as support in the form of equipment donations, technical assistance etc.
All funding for mine action including clearance and mine risk education is channelled from
the donors directly to the operating agencies. CMAA, the national regulatory and coordinating
authority disposes solely over funds for its proper activities, for the operational expenses of its
headquarters, its administrative staff etc.
CMAA’s operations are financed partly through UNDP, by donors (technical assistance,
equipment etc), and by the Government (salary for national staff etc). The surveys and
statistical production of CMVIS is supported by international NGOs (Red Cross etc) and
individual donors.

2003
CMAC
HALO
MAG
RCAF
CMAA
CMVIS
Others
Total
2004
CMAC
HALO
MAG
RCAF
CMAA
CMVIS
Others
Total

Total cost
(operations)

Donors
Bilateral

UNDP project and
Trust Fund

Government of
Cambodia

9.25
3.45
3.00

4.10
3.45
3.00
-

5.15
-

0.10
-

Capital
equipment etc

0.29

0.06

15.70
9.83
3.77
3.76
4.60

5.02
3.77
3.76
-

4.52
0.20
0.16

0.15
4.60
0.07

21.95

Table 4.3: Funding of the mine action programme in Cambodia, US$ millions.
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16.00
0.26

Some donors have expressed change in their priorities and have indicated a future decline in
funding levels. At this time it is important for the mine action programme to diversify the
funding base and supplement the current donors.
To sustain the current high levels of mine action interventions beyond 2012 external funding
and other support for mine action in Cambodia may progressively move from being mainly
external grant aid to a situation where government or commercial funding prevails. Then
mine and UXO clearance will be undertaken mostly by government agencies on a call-out
basis or contracted out by the government to commercial firms. Commercial contracts/subcontracts, executed by commercial, NGOs and/or government operators, will supplement call
out work. Mine/UXO awareness will be done primarily through the school system and
government-sponsored public education campaigns. Victim assistance will be primarily
handled through the governmental and non-governmental medical and social welfare
organisations.

4.6 Information and databases
4.6.1 Mine and Uxo victims
The Cambodian Mine/Uxo Victim Information System (CMVIS) was initiated in 1994 as an
organisation of the Cambodian Red Cross and Handicap International, Belgium. Since then it
has moved to cover the whole country in the year 2001. Incidents are reported on a monthly
basis, and additionally trends can be traced back to 1979.
Reports for the last 3 years 2001-2003 have been standardized to facilitate comparison and
trend analysis. Information is fairly detailed. Information collection is based on a network of
reporters receiving a compensation of US$ 5 for each (human?) casualty reported.
CMVIS neither claims nor intends to capture every occurrence of mine/Uxo accidents in
Cambodia. Presently it claims to capture between 80 and 90 % of all casualties. The large
efforts to ensure 100% coverage are believed not to justify the resource input needed. 51
In spite of the excellent information of on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents there are lacking
elements in the analysis that could help direct the clearance activity towards the most risky
locations. The CMVIS statistics could to a larger extent form basis for improved assessments
of which parts of the extensive mined area in the country that are generating the bulk of the
mine/Uxo accidents, representing a danger to the people now and in future years with
expected population movements etc.

4.6.2 Mine Action Database
By 2003 data on clearance and U.S. bombing was added to the L1S data, with the result
termed the National Mine Action Database (NMAD). Actually NMAD is the primary
repository of all mine related information within the Kingdom of Cambodia, and has the
capability to produce mapping products, reports, and statistics for all stakeholders.
NMAD provides CMAA with information to facilitate planning, management and reporting
of mine action operations. It provides data-collection capability, tools for analysing and
examining this data (including GIS), and the means to disseminate the processed information.
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NMAD now uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) which has
been customised to meet the specific requirements of the mine action programme in
Cambodia. Using IMSMA reporting functionalities, CMAA will report quarterly to the
Government, donors and United Nations Agencies on basis of reports from de-mining
operators on a regular basis.
The CMAA database on cleared areas needs to be consolidated, so that it can provide official
figures for clearance on location (province, district), types of areas, techniques etc for the
individual years since the start of the mine action programme. As of today this information
exists on different files which can be incomplete and inconsistent.
More information about the cost of clearance and of conducting other mine action activities
should be required from the operators. As a first approach the operators could supply
information on clearance time (in hours) of different tasks as an element to the CMAA
database on cleared areas (see also chapter 7).
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular what parts of
it should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the estimates of
the contaminated area as basis for further analysis of risk reduction etc (see chapter 5).

4.6.3 Socio-economic information
From 1992 to 2000 socio economic information was scattered and difficult to compare since
the criteria had not been the same for all operators. As a result few reliable data were
published.
Socio economic data from operators have been collected with the forms put in the guidelines
issued by the CMAA in 2003. Unfortunately, the relevant tables have not been
comprehensively filled in by the operators, as some data were difficult to find the first year of
implementation. 52
The CMAA Socio-economic Cluster, established in January 2004, has been set up to
coordinate this data gathering. The CMAA Socio Economic Guidelines were discussed and
adopted at workshops gathering all stakeholders in December 2004.
The Socio-economic Cluster should in particular have a responsibility with following up the
cost-benefit analysis.

52
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5.

Reducing the human loss

5.1
Accidents risk
The Cambodian National Mine Action Strategy 2004 states that clearance of the worstaffected areas will be given priority to reduce as soon as possible the risk of death or injury to
individuals living in landmine/Uxo -affected areas. This reduction of the impact of mines/Uxo
will be carried out as quickly as possible by increasing outputs coupled with improved
targeting of the most affected areas. 53 According to the Strategy the current distribution of
existing mine clearance capacities in the country could be able to clear the remaining parts of
the severely of contaminated land by 2012-2015. It further targets a decrease in the number of
mine and Uxo accidents towards a minimum at the end of the same period.
Considering a specific mine- and Uxo infested area; the effect of clearance on accident risk
reduction will depend on the danger this area represents to the local community, visitors, and
particularly to people moving in. The number of accidents and incidents experienced recently
may give an indication of this, but accident rates at the local level can be relatively small
numbers, subject to random variation from a year to another.
Some measure of the actual threat an area constitutes could be based on experience over many
years or from other places under similar circumstances, identifying concrete risk factors
related to the type of mined area, its proximity to large populations, the obstruction it
represents to important activities and infrastructure etc. Given certain conditions one should
not have to wait for a sufficient number of accidents to take place before moving into action,
but as indicated (chapter 4.3) studies demonstrating this connection are scarce in Cambodia
and elsewhere.
Furthermore it is generally admitted that while the clearance of minefields can reduce the
number of mine accidents, other measures like mine risk education will have to be
strengthened in order to reduce the number of Uxo casualties. In this cost benefit analysis it is
therefore assumed that while reductions in the mine accidents rate can be achieved through
clearance of suspected areas, only 30% of the Uxo victims will be affected by clearance. The
remaining 70% of the Uxo problem will have to be addressed otherwise.
Finally, on a realistic assumption, after clearance of these areas an estimated 10% of the mine
and Uxo accidents may still persist, not on the cleared land, but on low priority or outside
areas that failed to be identified at the outset.
For this cost benefit analysis a specific estimate of the high priority contaminated land is
proposed (discussed in chapter 4.3). It consists of the CMAA/L1S severe and high priority
categories for the provinces where these constitute the largest areas, and of the data from the
operators for the provinces where these are the most extensive. The resulting figure has then
been reduced by 25% so as to end up in line with the CMAA/L1S estimate of total severe and
high priority contaminated land in Cambodia, which is about 300 km2.
In the further analysis this area will be considered the principal source of mine and Uxo
(30%) accidents in the country and the individual provinces, while underlining that the
estimate is preliminary, to be exchanged for a better one when such data become available.
It has been difficult to trace any clear trend in the development of accident rates for the last
years on the national or the provincial level (see chapter 4.3). It is therefore suggested to base
the accident rate on an average for the 4 last years 2001-2004. Including all the mine
53

CMAA (2004): National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.1.

33

accidents and 30% of the Uxo accidents, this will amount to an average of 513 casualties
representing the “actual” accidents level in the country.
It is further presumed that this casualty rate can be reduced progressively through clearance of
the contaminated areas described above comprising a total of 304 km2, while retaining the
assumption that 10% of the accidents will “linger on” as a consequence for example of
difficulties with targeting the right areas.

Casualties annually

600
500

513

400
355
300
203

200
100
0
304

51
200

100

0

Mined area square km

Figure 5.1: The annual number of casualties related to the extent of the mined area.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the presumed connection between the casualty rate and the extent of the
mined area. According to this model the identified priority mined area of 304 km2 generates
513 mine and Uxo casualties annually, and this is supposed to describe the current situation in
the country. Clearance of contaminated land entails declines in the number of casualties; a
remaining mined area of 200 km2 for example would, according to figure 5.1, be expected to
cause 355 victims on an annual basis.
As an average for the whole country, clearance of 1 km2 will reduce the casualty rate with 1.5
mine/Uxo victims annually, and clearance of 1 km2 now will equivalently reduce the number
of accidents with 15 in total over a 10-years period. The model further assumes that clearance
of all the priority areas will not reduce the number of casualties to 0, since 10% or 51
casualties is expected to persist as the annual rate.
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Table 5.1: Clearance efficiency at the provincial level.
Provinces

Suspected
area in km2.
a

Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kracheh
Preah Vihear
Others
Total

Mine casualties +
30% Uxo, annual
average 2001-04
b

72
39
38
31
57
14
3
15
2
2
14
17
304

Victims when
mined areas
are cleared

Victims reduction
annually
per cleared km2.

c = 10%* b
147
18
17
51
109
57
8
24
7
9
25
37
513

d =(b-c)/a
15
2
2
5
11
6
1
2
1
1
3
4
51

Reduction in
a 10 years
period
e = d *10

1.8
0.4
0.4
1.5
1.7
3.8
2.2
1.4
3.5
4.7
1.6
2.0
1.5

The same approach has in Table 5.1 been applied on data disaggregated to the provincial
level. Information of the suspected area in each province (a) and the annual number of
mine/Uxo casualties (b), together with the assumption that 10% of the accidents (c) 54 still
persists after the suspected area (a) has been cleared, has been used to calculate the expected
reduction in casualty numbers as a result of the clearance activities (d).55 The figures in this
column thus show the impact from clearance of 1 km2 of priority area towards reduction of
the number of casualties actually experienced in that province. This factor (d) can be called
the “clearance efficiency rate.” The reduction over a 10 years’ period from clearing 1 km2
(e) 56 is equivalent with the annual reduction from clearing 10 km2.
The table reveals some significant differences among the provinces regarding the clearance
efficiency rate. When the principal objective is to reduce the number of mine/Uxo casualties
as quickly as possible within limited budgets, it appears that resources for clearance activities
could be spent more efficiently when directed to certain provinces as compared with others.
In Pailin a relatively high number of accidents (57) appear to be generated by a fairly limited
extent of mined area (14 km2). This constellation results in a rather high clearance efficiency
rate, a reduction of 3.8 victims annually or 38 victims over a 10 years’ period for each km2
cleared. Pailin is among the seriously affected provinces regarding accidents, while clearance
started only in the year 2000.
Among the accident prone provinces where large scale clearance has been going on since the
beginning of the mine action programme, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey also come out
with clearance efficiency rates above the average. Battambang is exposed to a level of mine
and Uxo accidents, which is for most years by far much higher than in any other province in
Cambodia, and the bulk of the Five Year Plan priority areas are also located there.

54

c =10% of b
d = (b-c)/a
56
e = d * 10
55

35

18
4
4
15
17
38
22
14
35
47
16
20
15

Siem Reap and Pursat appear to come out on the lower side regarding clearance efficiency
rates, indicating larger extents of suspected areas as compared to more moderate accident
levels there.
The three provinces Kampong Thom, Kampong Speu and Kracheh all have high clearance
efficiency rates. These are provinces, however, where Uxo accidents dominate completely;
altogether there were 3 mine accidents and 55 Uxo accidents in these 3 provinces combined in
2004. Their high efficiency rates as observed here are thus conditioned on the assumption that
land clearance activities can have an impact on at least 30% of their present Uxo accidents
level. Kampong Cham which had 4 mine casualties and 72 Uxo casualties alone in 2004
comes out with a lower efficiency rate, because more contaminated area has been identified
there.
Table 5.1 represents an attempt to locate regions or areas where clearance can be expected to
have more significant impacts on the accident rate, and conversely where it could be a costly
task, contributing only in the long run towards reduction of the number of casualties. The
conclusions will of course depend on the quality of the data input; here in particular the
estimates of the extent of the priority mined area and its distribution on provinces.
Furthermore the conclusions will be valid in cases when the accidents are found to be widely
and evenly distributed over the whole extent of the priority area identified in the province.
Since most provinces are large there might, however, be specific clearance tasks with higher
efficiency rates in some places than in others. Still, this would necessarily have to be evened
out by low efficiency tasks in other localities, which should then be reclassified so as not to
appear among the high priority impact areas.
In this way the suspected area could be progressively reduced or put into appropriate priority
categories. For the time being, however, the clearance efficiency estimates in table 5.1 may
have to pass on a preliminary basis.

5.2
Productive value
The appraisal of the gains from mine action towards reduced human loss will be based on
calculations of the potential contributions from an average Cambodian mine victim to the
productive activities of the country. Furthermore an estimate of the value of leisure time will
be added. This must not, however, in any ways be conceived of as the value of a human life.
Still it is in line with benefit calculations regularly undertaken by other types of initiatives
aimed at saving lives and reducing accidents risk, for example in road safety programmes.
The average, annual household income levels in rural areas in provinces affected by
mine/Uxo accidents can be ranged between US$ 300 and 700. 57 For adult victims it can be
assumed that the family breadwinners are the ones most exposed to mine/Uxo accidents risks.
Males are the most frequently represented among the mine/Uxo casualties, while women
victims may come from women-headed households (table 3.2). The typical adult victim’s
potential for income generation could thus be fixed rather towards the upper level, and a share
of non-marketed subsistence production value will also be added.
This cost benefit analysis will thus be based on an annual income of US$ 1000 per adult mine
victim. By using figures for average incomes unemployment rates will not have to be taken
into account. Unemployment is a complicated issue in rural Cambodia, where a large share of
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the population works as unpaid farm labour, being productive while not receiving any money
remuneration.
An average adult mine/Uxo victim could have a potential revenue-generating life-time of 35
years. For a child the average life expectancy is estimated to 45 years, including 5 years of
non-productivity in the beginning.
In addition to the productive value (contribution to GNP) a value of leisure time has been
added, stipulated to an equal amount, US$ 1000 per year, children and adults on the same
level.
The country’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy confirms the government’s aims to
achieve a sustainable real rate of economic growth of 6% to 7% per year, to reach an income
per head of US$320 at the end of 2005. This represents an annual growth rate in real income
per head of 3.5%. 58
The last goal, the growth in income per person, will be the proper basis for an estimate of the
increase in production generating capacity expected for a Cambodian over the coming years,
the potential revenue lost in case of mine victims. For the first 10 years the economic growth
per capita is thus fixed at 3.5%, in a longer perspective, however, the analysis will settle with
an estimate of 2.5% growth.
Estimates of future economic growth will enter into the analysis in different ways: First it will
affect the future production potential for a typical mine/Uxo victim of today over his/her
lifetime that is to say over an estimated span of 35 years for adult victims and 45 years for
children from now on. Secondly it must be taken into account that without clearance new
accidents will continue to occur also in future years, a period of 20 years has been considered
here. Because of the economic growth victims in those future years will have reached a higher
income level than today’s victims. The potential production lost with those victims will
therefore have to be calculated starting from the actual income level in the year when the
accident happened.
The analysis furthermore takes into account the difference in frequency of adults and children
among mine and the Uxo victims (with an average for all provinces) where, according to the
assumptions described above, only 30% of the Uxo casualties have been included.
The subsequent calculations result in an economic loss concerning a fatal casualty amounting
to about US$ 25,000 on the average when today’s productivity level is the starting point. The
annual production value the victim could have contributed has then been discounted over the
victim’s potential lifetime at a 10% rate. For future victims this value will be increasing with
the level of economic growth.

5.3
Medical costs
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates an average hospital stay for
patients with mine injuries to be 3 weeks, amputees stay almost 5 weeks and require on the
average 4 operations as well as antibiotics and blood transfusions. In addition amputees
should have prostheses replaced every 3 to 5 years or every 6 months for children. These
medical costs have been estimated (G Harris 2000) to US$ 550 on an annual basis. 59
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In the CMVIS statistics victims are classified into the categories of deaths, injured and
amputations. For the years 2002 and 2003 the victims are distributed as follows:
–

Deaths: 16%.

–

Amputations: 23%.

–

Injured: 61%.

In Cambodia it is realised that only a small number of the mine/Uxo victims receive rehabilitation assistance from national and international organisations. 60 An estimate could therefore
be that on the average only a half of the amputees receive the above prescribed treatment and
that a half of the injured victims receive a more limited treatment amounting to 50% the full
cost. It could, however, be assumed that over the years to come there will be an increase of
2% annually in the number of people treated or the amount allocated for such treatment.
The annual amounts will be discounted over the lifetime of the individual victims. The
analysis will then proceed to calculate the medical costs related to a future loss of one victim
annually over the analysis period, that is to say the next 20 years. With an analysis similar to
the one above it will then be taken into account that future victims start with a more comprehensive treatment already at the outset.

5.4
Economic gains from reducing the accident risk
Table 5.2 is summing up the economic loss related to mine/Uxo victims, when it is assumed
that a contaminated area is claiming one victim annually over the period under consideration,
that is to say 20 years.
Table 5.2: Total economic loss for typical victim and categories of mine/Uxo victims
One victim every year over 20 years
Death (fatal casualty)
Amputation
Productive loss
Medical costs
Injured
Productive loss
Medical costs

Disability %
100 %
70 %
40 %

US$
259 510
181 657
31 845
103 804
15 922

% of victims
16 %
23 %

Economic loss average casualty, one victim every year over 20 years, US$

60

US$
42 156
41 179
7 219
63 411
9 726

61 %

163 691

–

In connection with a fatal casualty the economic loss is total and there will be no
medical costs. Deaths comprise on the average 16% of the total number of victims.

–

An amputation is considered a 70% disability; the production loss will therefore be
70% compared to a fatal casualty. In addition there will be medical costs (as
explained in chapter 5.3). On the average 23% of the victims have to undergo
amputations.

–

Injured persons are considered to be disabled at 40%, and the productive loss will
be accordingly. There will also be medical costs connected to the treatment of
injuries, but amounting to only half the cost of treating amputees. Injured persons
comprise 61% of the mine/Uxo victims on the average.

Cambodia Millennium Development Goals Report 2003 (November 2003) chapter 2.9.4.
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A contaminated area expected to claim one victim per year actually and in the future will thus
cause an accumulated human loss over a 20 years period amounting to about US$ 163,000 in
economic terms. Future production losses and medical costs for different categories of victims
have then been discounted into today’s present value.
For the mine/Uxo exposed provinces of Cambodia in total it has been estimated that clearing
of one km2 of mine/Uxo contaminated land could on the average reduce the accident rate with
about 1.5 victims annually that is to say with 15 victims over a 10 years period. This rate has,
however, been found to vary with province (table 5.1), an this will have to be taken into
account when estimating the total economic gains from clearance of land there.
Table 5.3: Reduced human loss in economic terms from clearance of 1 km2 of land, net
present value over 20 years in 1000 US$.
Economic gains
1000 US$
300
70
64
241
283
614
365
235
566
768
268
323
249

Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kracheh
Preah Vihear
Others
Average

The observations from table 5.1 on the variations of clearance efficiency rates among the
provinces are in table 5.3 transferred into economic terms. The figures in table 5.3 can be
compared directly with the clearance cost of 1 km2 contaminated land.
It appears that clearance tasks in provinces like Pailin, Kracheh, Kampong Speu and to a
lesser degree also Kampong Thom and Battambang, come closest to defend clearance costs
on the account of reduced human loss. Provinces like Siem Reap and Pursat will have the
largest difficulties with reaching up.
In most cases additional benefits from using the cleared areas for productive purposes like
agriculture, infrastructures etc may be required in order to fully meet the clearance costs (see
chapter 6). The reservations made above on the quality of data are, however, still valid,
concerning in particular the need for revision of the estimates on priority suspected areas.
Applied in analysis for future years, 2006 and onwards, the benefit estimates in Table 5.3
should be updated according to the development of the Cambodian GDP per capita.
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6. Mine action for development
6.1 Clearance for agricultural purposes
The agricultural land cleared under the Cambodian mine action programme is specifically
destined for distribution among the poorest parts of the population. It is therefore not expected
that modern agricultural techniques and equipment will be used in the near future, which will
also be reflected in the yields and in the amount of input etc.
The staple food item in Cambodia is rice. The output from rice production will therefore be
used as a guideline for the production value of agricultural areas. Small farmers use their
areas also for fruit growing, vegetables etc, but output from such crops would usually not
come in addition to, but rather replace some of the rice crop.
Livestock production may on the other hand be a complementary trade, since animals to a
large extent can be fed on waste produce from the agriculture.

Provinces
Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kratie
Preah Vihear
Average

Paddy yield
Tonnes per ha
Wet
Dry
season
season
1.6
2.3
1.3
1.1
1.4
1.8
1.8
2.4
1.6
2.1
1.5
1.7

Dry
season
crops %

Net yield
Tonnes per
ha and year

Paddy farm
gate price
US$/tonne.

Paddy crop
margin
US$/ha/year

61

3.0
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.6
3.2
2.5
2.7
3.2

1%
3%
7%
0%
0%
19 %
5%
37 %
2%
38 %
0%
15 %

1.4
2.1
1.2
0.9
1.2
1.9
1.7
3.1
1.4
2.7
1.3
1.9

97
87
97
89
98
89
96
102
94
102
83
94

111
142
95
67
97
136
129
253
109
223
86
142

Animals per ha
farmland
Pigs
Poultry
0.4
0.9
0.7
3.3
0.4
4.4
0.7
1.5
1.7
3.3
1.7
1.2

Table 6.1: Agricultural production in mine action provinces. 62
The information of paddy yield shows variations in output and practices over the provinces.
Dry season yields, being dependent on the access to irrigation water, are significantly higher
than the wet season yields. In many regions, however, the dry season crops are small, only a
limited percentage of the area is replanted. These factors are combined in the calculation of
the “net yield in tonnes per ha and year.” Here is also taken into account that an estimated
13% of the crop is retained as seed for next year’s plantation or lost/wasted.
The farm gate price for paddy also shows some regional variations and is relatively low in
general. This information was collected in December 2003 for the Seila village database.
In the absence of more accurate information it has been assumed that 20% of the value of the
paddy production covers the cost of input factors. A large majority of the poor farmers will
use animal draught power and little artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Some of the household
members may have different options for work (in Thailand etc), while women, elderly people
61
62

Source for price information: Seila village database – December 2003.
Source for agricultural produce and practices : FAO Annual report 2002.
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4
31
5
28
3
40
6
11
16
13
18
10

and children may only be employed in farm work. Their labour input could therefore have a
low alternative cost.
On basis of this information can be calculated the paddy crop margin in US$ per ha per year.
These annual net revenues from paddy cultivation are widely varying among the provinces.
Information is available about the livestock population in different provinces. It is here
assumed that the stock of pigs and poultry a particular year is roughly equivalent to the
production output for sale or own consumption. The livestock population is further assumed
related to the extent of the cultivated area in the province. Table 6.1 thus shows the number of
pigs and poultry per ha cultivated land.
It is assumed that pigs and poultry live off wastes from the farmland, the crops or from
adjacent forest areas, so that there may be few input factors connected with raising them.
Those who are not bred for consumption within the farmer’s household will be sold alive.
Most of the labour input will also be performed by household members with few alternative
occupations.
According to the Poverty Reduction Strategy the agricultural sector in Cambodia is growing
at a rate of 3.6% annually, but output experiences large year-to-year fluctuations, reflecting
insufficient investment in the sector, over-exploitation of natural resources, and precarious
weather conditions. 63 A long-term annual productivity increase of 2% has thus been found
appropriate and is built into this analysis.
The value of agricultural production has been considered over 20 years, discounted to present
value at a rate of 10%. The market value of the land at the end of the period has been
estimated to 5 times the value of the produce for the last year.
The fear that it might be mined is in many places in Cambodia an important reason for not
taking agricultural land into use, and in some instances this fear might be based on lack of
information. When de-mining is taking place in a region it will presumably be possible also to
open up land adjacent to the actual minefields, by applying various techniques for reducing
the suspected area at considerably less cost than full clearance, marking and sealing off mined
areas from non-contaminated land etc.
Only site specific information can decide whether this is the case and to what extent. Here the
extra benefit in this respect is estimated preliminarily to an additional 30% of land which can
be settled, planted and harvested etc.

63

Council for Social Development (2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.1.1.
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Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kracheh
Preah Vihear
Average

Farm revenues per square km land, 1000 US$
Annual Net present value over 20 years
Cleared land
+ 30% land
14
152
197
25
266
346
14
151
196
28
305
397
12
133
173
44
470
612
18
191
248
35
375
487
23
243
316
41
444
577
21
224
291
22
240
311

Table 6.2: Revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land, US$ per year and net present value over
20 years, with an additional 30% of land made available.
In Table 6.2 the net revenues from paddy farming and from rising livestock are combined and
related to the cultivation of 1 km2 of land. Revenues are found to be highest in Pailin and
Kracheh, more than 3 times higher than in Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap and Battambang.
Agricultural areas in Pailin, Kracheh and Kampong Cham will provide the largest
contribution towards covering their clearance costs. Areas in Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap
and Battambang will have much more difficulties with justifying clearance demands when
counting agricultural benefits only.
The revenues from agricultural production will apparently on their own account have
difficulties with justifying the cost of mine/Uxo clearance in many areas; this conclusion
seems valid for the majority of the provinces in Cambodia. The explanation lies in the
generally low yields of rice and in rather low farm-gate prices for the produce. From table 6.1
it is clear that access to irrigation water in the dry season could improve the situation very
much. Production in the dry season could also presumably be sold at a higher price than can
be obtained at the end of the wet season (December).
There is a challenge towards gathering more socio-economic data on the total benefits to the
local community from clearance of land. The question could for example be how much more
land can be distributed for resettlement and agricultural use as a direct consequence of
clearance of some specific land. In some instances more land than that which was cleared
could be taken into use, and such cases would be important to have knowledge of at the
planning stage.
In the socio-economic reports there is already provision for registration of indirect
beneficiaries from the land cleared, in addition to those beneficiaries directly taking into use
formerly contaminated areas. As of the Work Plan for 2004 the direct beneficiaries are
counted to 11,000 families and the indirect to 71,000 families. 64

64

CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.2.2.

42

Cost benefit analysis for future years should update the revenue estimates in Table 6.2 with
the development in the price of paddy and livestock.

6.2 Irrigation canals
Mine clearance related to irrigation canals and systems aims at reopening the possibility for
irrigation of agricultural areas. Clearance of the canal area will therefore presumably benefit a
much wider extent of agricultural land. In specific cost benefit analyses this relation will vary
from case to case, and little information is currently available for concocting a general case.
A possible assumption could therefore be that 1 km of irrigation canals will allow dry-season
irrigation and planting of 1 km2 agricultural land. The canal will presumably have to be
cleared in a 20 m wide sector on each side (40 m in total), so that a 1 km long canal will
constitute a clearance task of 4 ha or 0.04 km2.
Access to irrigation water provides opportunities for dry-season crops. The irrigated land
generally produces higher yields than wet season plantations (Table 6.1), with some variations
as of province. The benefits from clearing a 1 km long canal will accordingly comprise the
extra net revenues to the farmers from dry season crops on 1 km2 of land. There will
presumably be no effect on livestock production while the other elements in the analysis of
agricultural production (chapter 6.1) remain unchanged.
Some provinces in Cambodia appear to offer few possibilities for dry season replanting as of
the statistics. They will not be included here, but specific cost benefit analyses should look
into such opportunities from case to case.

Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kratie
Preah Vihear
Average

Farm revenues per sq km land, 1000 US$
Annual
Net present value over 20 years
20
219
15
158
17
180
0
0
17
182
12
133
17
186
23
244
17
177
19
204
0
0
21
223

Table 6.3: Dry season crop revenues from 1 km2 irrigated agricultural land, US$ per year and
net present value over 20 years.
Table 6.3 shows the net extra benefits to farmers from access to irrigation water in the dry
season. There are some regional variations.65

65

The revenues in table 6.3 are lower in many cases than those in table 6.1, among others since no extra incomes
from livestock are presumed.
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The main point is, however, that the extra net revenues per km2 of irrigated land in table 6.3
are benefits resulting from the clearance of a much smaller area, an irrigation canal of 1 km
length, which could constitute a clearance task of not more than 0.04 km2.
Assuming for example a clearance cost level of US$ 0.9 per m2, or US$ 900,000 per km2, the
clearance of a 1 km irrigation canal would cost about US$ 36,000 which is the figure to be
compared with the “net present value over 20 years” in table 6.3.
As this comparison shows, in all cases and provinces the benefits from clearance of irrigation
canals have no problems with justifying the clearance costs. Such tasks should in fact be
undertaken even if the clearance costs for some reason were substantially higher or the
irrigation canal needed considerably longer than the 1 km considered here.

6.3 Loss of livestock
The number of livestock killed or injured in mine/ Uxo accidents is given in table 6.4 as of
CMVIS statistics. On the average a loss of about 50 animals is reported annually over the
period 2001 to 2003. The number seems to have decreased substantially, which could be a
benefit from clearance. There is, however, a report of 40 cows from the Battambang province
in 2001 which stands out as rather exceptional.
If these figures tell the whole story the losses of livestock do not amount to much in economic
terms. Even if the value of an animal is estimated as high as US$ 500, the loss will comprise
less than US$ 85 per km2 priority area per year on the average.
2001
2002
Cows
76
38
Buffalos
1
6
Horses
1
1
Other animals
4
3
Total
82
48
Source: CMVIS: National Census 2001-03.

2003
12
1
1
7
21

Average
42
3
1
5
50

Table 6.4: Livestock killed or injured at mine/Uxo incidents.
Most likely there is an underreporting of animals killed or injured in mine accidents in
Cambodia. In the best case the figures in Table 6.4 seem to comprise only incidents where
also humans were injured or killed. Moreover the figures in Table 6.4 are contradicted by
other observations that 14% of the villagers in Cambodia had lost at least one animal to
landmines. 66
These are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a more
significant economic loss; in Afghanistan very high losses were indeed reported. This could
call for an improved reporting system of damage to domestic animals by landmines. The most
practical approach could be to improve the CMVIS reporting system so that animals killed
and injures to animals are recorded regularly as part of the monthly census, also including
incidents with no damage to human beings.

66

Level One Survey, referred in CMAC: Annual Report 2003, page 2.
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6.4 Transport systems
“Improved roads” is often quoted as first priority when villagers in Cambodia express their
preferences for infrastructure. Transport facilities often constitute a key factor, leading to
increased agricultural production, more land under cultivation and intensified land use, as
farmers take advantage of expanded market opportunities.
Rural infrastructure is inadequate in Cambodia, with extremely poor transport links. The rural
road network is often in disrepair rendering roads impassable, especially during the wet
season. In addition, many of these rural roads pass through minefields or areas littered with
Uxo. The mine action programme cleared 313 km of roads in 2003, while 29 km are planned
cleared in 2004 according to the National Work Plan (without RCAF which has been
extensively engaged in road clearance).
Clearance of roads will benefit persons and vehicles using the road in the form of more
convenient transport opportunities, reduced travel time and travel costs. Mine-contaminated
road links may generally hinder road users from travelling the shortest route to their
destinations. In this analysis it is presumed that a kilometre of mined roads will cause
diversion of traffic onto other links of double distance on the average. The benefits from
clearance of 1 km of mined roads will thus consist of the savings to road traffic and transport
from travelling a 1 km shorter route.
This assumption has been made in order to concoct a general case. Specific cost benefit
analyses should reflect the local conditions and take into account actual travel distances at
alternative routes. The salient issue will be the difference between the travel distances on the
reopened road compared to the alternatives the traffic had to use before clearance.

Daily traffic (annual average) 67
Generated traffic 40%
Speed km/hour
Passengers per trip
Reduced travel distance, km
Reduced travel time hours per year
Value travel time US$/day
Value of reduced travel time in US$/year
Vehicle operating cost US$/km
Vehicle operating cost US$/year
Reduced time cost generated traffic
US$/year
Reduced VOC generated traffic US$/year
Total gains US$/year

Ox-cart

Bicycle

Motorbike

Car/pickup

Truck

297
119
15
3
1
20790
0,23
598
0.07
7277
120

Motortrailer
26
10
10
5
1
4550
0,23
131
0.1
910
26

19
8
2
2
1
6650
0,23
191
0.001
7
38

13
5
5
1
1
910
0,23
26
0.001
5
5

19
8
15
10
1
4433
0,23
127
0.1
665
25

5
2
15
10
1
1167
0,23
34
0.36
630
7

1
237

1
37

1455
9449

182
1249

133
951

126
796

Table 6.5: Transport and traffic analysis.
Information about annual average daily traffic has been obtained from counts undertaken by
the Tertiary Roads Improvement Programme (TRIP) on rural roads. The clearance is thus
presumably concerned with rural or tertiary roads. Here a large part of the traffic consists of
motorbikes.
67

Source: The Tertiary Road Improvement Programme (TRIP)
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Information about passenger numbers, vehicle operating costs (VOC) for categories of
vehicles and the value of travel time has to some extent been obtained from the ILO Upstream
Project. Data have however, been modified somewhat for use in this analysis. It is assumed
that reducing the travel distance to the half will increase traffic by 40%.
The shorter travel distance will reduce time on the road for the persons travelling. These gains
can be evaluated by an assumption of people’s willingness to pay for time savings. Shorter
distance to destination will also generate savings related to vehicle operations, for each
category according to their specific unit costs. Benefits for generated traffic have, according
to standard cost benefit techniques, been evaluated relative to the consumer surplus.
The savings for motorbike traffic and in particular their VOC, will as expected form the most
important benefit component related to improvement of the rural roads network. Other groups
of road users contribute much less. In total, however, the amount is considerable, about US$
13,000 on an annual basis.
Annual
13

Benefits from clearance of 1 km of rural road, 1000 US$

Net present value over 20 years
108

Table 6.6: Mine clearance of rural roads, annual and net present values in 1000 US$.
The annual benefits have then been discounted over a 20 years’ future period into a net
present value. This value can be compared to the clearance costs of 1 km of rural roads.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) requires de-mining of rural road alignments to a width
of 20 metres on each side of the road centreline. 68 Taking this requirement into account a 1
km road link will constitute a clearance task of 4 ha or 0.04 km2.
Assuming for example a clearance cost level of US$ 0.9 per m2, or US$ 900,000 per km2, the
clearance of a 1 km road link would cost about US$ 36,000 which can be compared to the net
present value over 20 years in table 6.6 of US$ 108,000.
Still the state of repair of the road ought to be taken into account. Clearance tasks regularly
form integral parts of rural roads rehabilitation programmes. Rehabilitation of rural roads may
cost at least US$ 6,000 per km (upgrading). 69 The actual need must be assessed from case to
case.
Clearance tasks on rural roads thus appear to be well capable of defending their cost. In case
the cleared road should replace alternative links which are only 50% (or ½ km) longer, the
benefits will be reduced to the half or about US$ 54,000. Still this would exceed normal road
clearance costs by a clear margin.

6.5 Schools
School attendance is low in Cambodia, and where schools exist, class sizes are frequently
large, 50 children per class or more. Often two or three shifts a day are needed due to the
limited number of classrooms. Schools are frequently dilapidated, old buildings or very
simple wooden framed, open-sided structures with thatch or corrugated iron roofs. In some
places, classes are held in private houses in the absence of other facilities.
68
69

Asian Development Bank (2001): The North-western Rural Development Project, page 16.
NCG (2004): Rural Infrastructure Development in Cambodia, page 53.
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A total of 61 schools were cleared under the mine action programme in 2003 (by the civilian
agencies), constituting an estimated 4% of the cleared area, while 41 schools have been
identified for clearance in the Work Plan for 2004.
It could be assumed that a school constitutes of 2 shifts of classes with 40 pupils in each so
that 80 pupils 70 attend the school every day, 6 days a week for 40 weeks a year. The village
school premises have been mined, however, so instead of attending the nearest and most
convenient location, the pupils have to travel and crowd in on schools in other villages. The
extra travel distance could be 5 km each way on the average for each of them. An assumption
can also be made that 80% the pupils are travelling by bicycle with 2 on each and 20% as
passengers on motorbikes, with 2 pupils each bike.
The socio-economic cost of this extra transport will then comprise the operational costs of
bikes and motorbikes for all the 2 x 5 km return trips needed every day of the school-year plus
the extra time costs of the pupils and the motorbike drivers.
Pupils per class
Number of shifts a day
Days a week
School weeks a year
Extra distance to school km
Trips to and from a day

40
2
6
40
5
2
Bicycle
80 %
2

Mode of travelling
Pupils per mode of transport
Driver
Number of transports a day
Travel speed km/hour
Value of travel time US$/day
Vehicle operating cost US$/km
Time cost annually US$
Travel cost annually US$

32
5
0.15
0.001
576
77

Motorbike
20 %
2
1
8
15
0.23
0.07
85
1344

Table 6.7: School attendance and cost of transport to school.
Table 6.7 gives the input information used in the analysis. For the vehicle operating cost the
assumptions correspond to those applied in chapter 6.5 on road transport. Value of travel time
has been reduced to US$ 0.15 a day for the children, retaining US$ 0.23 for the motorbike
drivers. The time loss and costs will be highest for bicycle transport (also with a 50%-50%
share), while the higher vehicle operation costs make motorbike a far more expensive mode.
Annual
2.1

Benefits from clearance of school premises, 1000 US$

Net present value over 20 years
18

Table 6.8: Benefits from clearance of schools, 1000 US$ annually and net present value over
20 years.
70

The 41 schools planned for clearance in the NWP for 2004 comprise 7082 pupils or over 170 pupils per school
(NWP chapter 2.2.3).
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As table 6.8 shows the total net benefits from clearance of school areas, resulting in reduced
need for travelling to schools in distant villages, amount to about US$ 2,100 annually or US$
18,000 as net present value over a 20 years’ period. The last figure can be compared with the
clearance cost of school areas.
Based on information from previous clearance tasks, a school area can be estimated to about
1.2 ha on the average. A clearance cost of US$ 0.9 per m2 would thus amount to US$ 10,800
for a school area of 1.2 ha, which is well below the estimated benefits of US$ 18,000. Such
tasks could be justified even in cases when the areas to be cleared were considerably larger, or
the children were able to find alternative school facilities within closer range. For schools
with larger numbers of pupils than the 80 considered, the benefits would increase
proportionally.

6.6 Wells and water supply
Lack of clean domestic water is a major problem for many rural people in Cambodia,
especially in the dry season. Most rely on shallow dug wells or nearby rivers for household
water and many have to travel long distances to the closest source of supply. The costs
connected to the provision of water supply comprise more than the eventual drilling and
construction of the well. Usually there will be a considerable amount of planning and field
research connected in order to provide stable and safe supplies with enough water also in the
dry season, together with institutional components to secure sustainability. Donor
programmes in this field tend to be costly.
Wells are thus not easily replaced, and when a well has been mined the alternative supply
may be located far away, be contaminated or prove insufficient for the demand, so that the
users will have to line up and wait, sometimes for hours. In times of shortage one member
may have to be constantly occupied with the provision of water for the family. This task will
often fall on one of the children, being then prevented from attending school.
A total of 130 wells were de-mined in 2003, and estimated to comprise an area of 0.2 ha each
on the average such tasks constituted 1.3% of the total area cleared (by the civilian operators).
For the 2004 Work Plan 14 tasks have been identified.
We can safely assume that a well considered for clearance will be a much needed well,
serving a community of perhaps as many as 15 families. When this near by source of water
supply has been blocked, one family member, that is to say 15 persons from the community,
may have to travel as much as 5 km, 70% of them using bicycle and 30% motorbike for the
transport. At the source this person may have to wait 1 hour on the average in order to fill up
the container for transport back. It is assumed here that water is fetched by an adult person.
One trip every day is needed, but limited to the dry season only, that is to say for 26 weeks a
year.
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Persons engaged
Number of trips a day
Days a week
Weeks a year
Distance to source km
Trips to and from
Waiting at source, hours

15
1
7
26
5
2
1
Bicycle
70 %
5
3
0,23
0,001
165
19

Mode of travelling
Travel speed km/hour
Duration one trip, hours
Value of travel time US$/day
Vehicle operating cost US$/km
Time cost annually US$
Travel cost annually US$

Motorbike
30 %
15
1,7
0,23
0,07
39
573

Table 6.9: Water supply and cost of water transport.
Table 6.9 provides the input data for the analysis of benefits related to reopened access to a
water supply source in the vicinity. The benefits are calculated as the reduced amount of
transport cost and travel time needed in comparison with the collection of water from more
distant sources.
Annual
0.8

Benefits from clearance of wells, 1000 US$

Net present value over 20 years
6.8

Table 6.10: Benefits from clearance of wells, 1000 US$ annually and net present value over
20 years.
As Table 6.10 shows the benefits from clearing a well, estimated by the method described
above, could amount to US$ 800 annually. Discounted over a 20 years’ period the total
benefits would thus constitute US$ 6,800, which is the figure to be compared with the
clearance cost of wells.
Clearance of a well that on the average comprises a task of 0.2 ha, will cost about US$ 1,800
a piece, assuming unit costs of 0.9 US$ per m2 or US$ 9,000 per ha.
It can therefore be concluded that the benefits from such clearance tasks are well capable of
defending their costs, even in cases when the suspected areas are significantly larger. When
the number of families using this source of water supply is higher than the 15 presumed here,
the benefits will increase proportionally.

6.7 Historical and cultural sites
Cambodia’s tourist sector is playing a crucial role and is considered a key to the country's
development. Over the last decade it has made significant contributions to economic growth
by attracting foreign investments, creating jobs, and generating income for the local people.
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With Cambodia’s enormous cultural and natural heritage, the policy will be geared towards
cultural and eco-tourism.
There are many historical sites in Cambodia. The Angkor temple complex is a world's
heritage site. Besides that actions are taken to develop other cultural and eco-tourist
destinations such as the Kulen Mountain, Kos Ker temple, Preah Vihea temple, Ta Mok house
in Anlong Veng, and Sambo Prey in the central zone. Preservation of the historical sites is a
socio-cultural obligation, which can also generate revenues in foreign exchange, and the
Cambodian government intends to use tourism as a strategy in its overall goal to relieve
poverty. 71
An important task of mine clearance was carried out in the south of the province of Siem
Reap from 1992 on, to give access to the main historical and religious site in the Kingdom of
Cambodia, the Angkor area. From 1993-2003 the clearance tasks related to temple areas there
amounted to 1.1 km2 in total. 72 The temple areas of Angkor comprise in total about 250 km2.
Total receipts from tourist related activities were estimated to US$ 454 million in 2002, with
an increase of 19.5% from the year before. In 2002 tourist receipts accounted for 11.4% of
GDP. Average tourist expenditures in Cambodia were US$ 577 per person in 2002. 73
The total number of foreign tourists to Angkor will in 2004 exceed 420,000. 74 Assuming that
the above mentioned figure of US$ 577 reflects the gross spending per tourist rather than the
contribution to the GNP, a more conservative estimate of US$ 200 per tourist per year will be
applied, to account for the deduction of inputs from other sectors to the tourist industry.
This would nevertheless result in an annual income generation of US$ 320,000 from each of
the 250 km2 of temple areas in Angkor, on the assumption of 400,000 tourists per year. This
amount is spent inside the country, but not necessarily entirely within the localities harbouring
the temples. It is, however, assumed that the historic sites with the ancient temples constitute
the main attraction for tourists into Cambodia.
Tourists at Angkor annually, 1000
Tourist contribution to GNP, US$ per visitor
Angkor temple areas km2.
Annual revenues per km2 temple area in Angkor, US$ 1000
Income generation compared with Angkor
Incomes per sq km from opening up other temple areas, US$ 1000
Additional attraction of tourists, annual number per km2 of temple area.

400
200
250
320
50 %
160
800

Table 6.11: Tourists and tourist revenues from temple areas
On the other hand it can not be expected that the opening up of new areas will generate
incomes to that extent. From a cautious optimism some 50% of that amount could perhaps be
foreseen, which would still constitute an income of about US$ 160,000 annually from each
new km2 of temple area opened up. A total of 800 additional tourists would then be attracted
annually per km2 of temple area with renewed access.

71

Council for Social Development (2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.2.3.
Source: CMAC Demining Unit 6.
73
National Institute of Statistics: Statistical Yearbook 2003, page 293.
74
Source: Ministry of Tourism. January – October 2004: 418,000 foreign and 290,000 Cambodian tourists.
72
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Benefits from opening up 1 km2 of temple area, 1000 US$

Annually
160

Net present value over 20 years
1362

Table 6.12: Benefits from clearance of temple areas, 1000 US$
The annual contribution to the GNP of US$ 160,000 can be discounted over 20 years resulting
in a total net present value to the economy of US$ 1.36 million from opening up 1 km2 of
temple area for tourism. This figure can then be compared with the cost of clearance.
At a rate of US$ 0.9 per m2 or US$ 900,000 per km2 the clearance costs would end up well
below the estimated future benefits of US$ 1.36 million, and clearance tasks in temple areas
could come out with a considerable surplus.
Presumably there might not even be need for de-mining the entire temple premises. In the
Angkor temple area of 250 km2 about 1.1 km2 of clearance tasks were identified (there is still
much Uxo remaining). The clearance task could thus perhaps be reduced to 75% or maybe
even 50% of the actual temple area opened up for visitors.
For a particular clearance task the assumptions applied here must be checked and adapted to
local circumstances. Still it appears that the benefits from the tourist industry alone could very
well be capable of defending the costs of clearance tasks related to temples.

6.8 Health stations
Access to health stations may be difficult in rural Cambodia, in the remote areas there are few
available and people travel considerable distances. When some premises are mined, people
from neighbouring villages may have difficulties with finding alternatives close by. It is thus
assumed here that they may have to travel on the average 5 km longer to reach to the nearest
location.
The travellers will consist of sick people needing transport, but also of people accompanying
them, mothers with children for example. It is here assumed that a station closed because of
mine contamination will generate need for extra travel for 15 persons a day, during 5 days a
week, 50 weeks a year. The travel will be to and fro, that is to say 10 km in all. It is also
assumed that 70% need motorized transport (motorbike), while the rest is using bicycle.
Benefits from clearance so that a health station can reopen include reduced travel costs and a
valuation of the reduced travel time (see tables 6.7 and 6.9).

Benefits from clearance of health stations, US$ 1000

Annually
2.0

Net present value over 20 years
16.7

Table 6.13: Benefits from clearance of health stations, 1000 US$ annually and net present
value over 20 years.
Table 6.13 gives the annual benefits from clearance of health stations, and the net present
value discounted over 20 years. This last figure can be compared to the actual cost of clearing
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the contaminated area comprising the health station. Assuming that a health station on the
average occupies an area of 1.2 ha and a clearance cost of US$ 9,000 per ha, it appears that
clearance of health stations is well capable of defending its costs.

6.9 Other social and cultural infrastructure
Regarding administrative offices, pagodas etc, the relevant items on the benefit side will
comprise the construction costs including the value of the terrain. Here the state of repair of
the building on site must also be taken into account; there will perhaps be need for
rehabilitation, which should be reflected in the value estimate. This value can then be
compared directly with the cost of clearance.
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7. Clearance techniques and costs
7.1 Approaches and techniques in use
The agencies currently involved in the mine action programme in Cambodia actually
comprise the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), the HALO Trust, the Mines Advisory
Group (MAG), constituting the 3 civilian operators, and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.
There is little standardization among the operators as of the approach to the tasks, the set-up
of teams for the field work, techniques and types of equipment in use. This makes it difficult
to compare efficiency and costs.
On the other hand, there might also be advantages to some degrees with letting the operators
pursue their own approach and experiment with the best way of meeting technical and
economic challenges. Competition among the operators is, however, limited, as there is no
regular practice of putting larger clearance tasks out on tender. Each operator to a large extent
benefits from its proper and regular sources for funding (see chapter 4.5).
Manual de-mining is the basic technique applied by all operators, this is also a slow technique
and therefore costly. It can, however, be applied widely on almost all types of terrain.
Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) have been introduced by CMAC, at the outset with technical
support from Sweden. The use of MDD is in particular appropriate in areas with high contents
of fragmented metal, on hard ground, and in quality control. Dogs can also be used for
technical survey and area reduction. CMAC actually disposes of 5 MDD teams which cleared
an area of about 1.3 km2 in 2003. 75
In Cambodia the mechanical de-mining techniques consist of various types of machinery used
to prepare the ground for manual or dog teams, largely through cutting the vegetation before
de-mining. Operators claim large efficiency gains from using these brush-cutters on suitable
terrain.
Operators have developed different approaches of involving local communities in minemarking, Uxo disposal and mine risk education and reduction activities. The approach is vital
especially as a way to cope with the growing Uxo accidents problem in the country.
One factor influencing clearance productivity to a high degree is the different practices among
operators towards applying area reduction techniques before clearance operations start. This is
a field where new approaches are being introduced to give more value for money, in the form
of clearance of areas which really were infested. On the paper, however, it might in some
cases reduce productivity, measured as costs per m2 cleared for example.
Survey activities constitute an important task in mine action, both for marking and fencing off
areas to avoid accidents, to reduce areas to be cleared and thereby the costs, but also to gather
information about the type of area, soil type, content of metal etc. which can help determine
the cost of clearance and the use and benefits from the area after clearance.
7.2 Clearance costs
Information about the costs of mine and Uxo clearance in Cambodia is of widely varying
quality. Even the information about financing is lacking, since the amounts RCAF receives
are largely unknown. Some operators receive considerable donations in kind, of equipment
and technical assistance. These donations do not regularly appear as costs in the accounts.
75

CMAC Annual Report 2003, page 30.
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For the year 2003 CMAC presents an average cost of US$ 0.95 per m2 cleared, underlining
that this cost also includes a number of non-clearance activities. 76 RCAF consistently applies
a rate of US$ 0.35 per m2 in its calculations of de-mining costs. 77
Based on its total project income and clearance rates HALO calculates its cost to US$ 0.68
per m2 land cleared in 2004. This constitutes a 10% improvement from the year before. 78
In Cambodia village de-mining continues, although technically it is illegal. In some cases,
people hire a village de-miner to clear the land for them. Landmine Monitor 2003 reported
that in Banteay Meanchey the price for clearing one hectare was US$ 90 while in
Battambang, the price rose from US$ 100 to 250 per ha in 2002 (US$ 0.025 per m2). 79
A recent study (Griffin and Keeley 2004) based on model calculations for Cambodia, has
found costs per m2 ranging from US$ 1.50 when only manual de-mining is used, to US$ 0.96
with the current mix of machines, dogs and manual de-mining teams. Using dogs to a larger
extent could, in combination with other cost reduction measures reduce costs further to US$
0.65 - 0.62 per m2 land cleared. 80
Analysis of cost estimates presented by operators to their clients reveals unit rates of about
US$ 0.85 per m2 after adding depreciation and 10% overhead costs.
A complete picture of the cost of clearance should comprise:
–

Only those activities connected to the clearance of mines and Uxo (still training,
survey, planning etc related to clearance should be regarded as integral parts).

–

Free of charge inputs, grants of equipment, technical assistance, manpower, housing
etc from donors or the government should be costed in a regular way.

–

Input and use of all types of capital goods like equipment and machinery, should be
costed on basis of regular annual depreciation rates.

–

Appropriate maintenance costs on a sustainable basis must be included for all
equipment.

–

Overhead costs must be included also when they are financed separately.

–

Techniques and methods in use must conform to international security standards.

The operators should be required to provide CMAA with better data on the cost of conducting
different mine action activities. One way of relating costs to the types of area cleared and the
different approaches and techniques used, could be to go via registration of the time used in
hours for each individual clearance task (some operators already collect such data). Cost per
hour for different types of teams and tasks will presumably be a much more stable and less
controversial entity than the costs per m2 cleared. This cost per hour can then through a
second step be calculated into cost per m2 after an analysis of what time it takes on the
average to clear a certain type of area with a given technique. These figures may be expected
to vary, being depending on a number of factors.
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CMAC Annual Report 2003, Executive Summary page v.
Engineer Forces Command HQ Report: The result of mine and unexploded ordnance clearance 2004.
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The HALO Trust Cambodia: Annual Report 2004, page 6.
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Paterson and Vanna (2004): A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action, Case Study of Cambodia
(GICHD September 2004) page 34.
80
Griffin and Keeley (December 2004): Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia, Annex 2.2.
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Some operators are in the process of developing their accounting procedures, which could
result in better cost-estimates with more details on different types of areas, tasks and
techniques which are largely non-existent now.
For the further analysis it will be assumed that the existing cost level for the clearance
activities conducted under the mine action programme in Cambodia could be situated in the
vicinity of US$ 0.90 per m2, while there might be possibilities of efficiency gains resulting in
a reduction towards about US$ 0.70 through use of dogs to a larger extent etc. A factor
leading in the opposite direction, however, is that clearance may in the future more and more
have to be conducted in the remote and difficult accessible regions of the country.
7.3 De-mining accidents
The number of de-mining accidents reported is actually at a level of about 10 a year. In 2003
CMAC reported incidents involving 7 de-miners, of which 2 were seriously wounded, the
others slightly injured. 81 HALO reports of three accidents in 2004, two of them in minefields
inflicting minor wounds on one person. The third one involved a de-mining supervisor who in
disregard of direct instructions attempted to cut open an anti-tank mine. This led to his
death. 82 CMVIS reports of 8 accidents during de-mining in 2003 and 4 in 2002. For earlier
years de-mining is not a category in the CMVIS statistics. 83 On the other hand the CMVIS
figures may include accidents both with the official operators and unofficial private clearance.
There is a question, however, to what extent accidents may go unreported. An initiative could
be taken to establish a record also for the previous years, of accidents linked directly to demining and Uxo clearance with the certified de-mining operators.
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CMAC Annual Report 2003, page 71.
HALO Trust Annual Report 2004, page 5.
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CMVIS National Census 2002-2003, page 21.
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8.

Evaluation of priorities

8.1
Assumptions and approach
The achievements of the Cambodian mine action programme will in this and the next chapters
(8-9) be evaluated by applying standard cost benefit methodology. The effect on the two
principal objectives of mine action, reducing the human loss and clearance for development
will be measured in economic terms, with further conclusions on how and where the mine
action programme can contribute to fulfil these goals in the most efficient way. The
assessment of the human loss conducted in chapter 5 and the different types and tasks of
min/Uxo clearance for development activities evaluated in chapters 6, together with the
observations on current clearance costs in chapter 7, provide the main input to this analysis.
The analysis makes extensive use of the benefit cost ratio (BCR) 84 for the comparison of
different clearance activities and tasks (on methodology see chapter 1.3). A positive BCR
means that the benefits cover the costs, the break even point is 0, and with a negative BCR the
economic benefits as calculated here do not suffice to justify the clearance costs. This needs
not imply, however, that other than economic benefits are irrelevant; frequently there will be
additional considerations to take into account.
Still, in many cases those other benefits may have a direct relation to the economic benefits as
calculated here; to the number of mine/Uxo victims expected avoided in future years, and to
the size and types of area that can be reclaimed for useful purposes. In such cases the actual
priority indicated may still be relevant, even though the BCR might experience an upgrading
in magnitude through the inclusion of other benefits, so that more clearance activities and
tasks come out on the positive side. This could call for more resources to mine action, but
nevertheless by withholding the main rank of priority.
The benefit side of the ratio will thus regularly comprise the two main components:
(1) Development effects; including production or revenue increase, improved access to
infrastructure etc.
(2) Expected reduction of human loss.
The cost side has been assessed in two alternatives, a cost of US$ 0.90 or US$ 0.70 per m2 of
land cleared, as explained in chapter 7 (amounting to US$ 9,000 or 7,000 per ha).

8.2
Agricultural land
The evaluation of clearance tasks on agricultural land come out with rather low benefits
compared to the costs. The agricultural output is generally moderate in Cambodia, even
though an annual 2% increase in output has been included in the analysis, and it is presumed
that the clearance of an area on the average can open up 30% more of formerly suspected land
for productive use (see chapter 6.1).

84

Benefits minus costs divided by costs, the factors being discounted to present value at a rate of 10%.
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Provinces
Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Preah Vihear
Average/others

Agricultural land
Production Human loss
Per cent of benefits
40 %
60 %
83 %
17 %
75 %
25 %
62 %
38 %
38 %
62 %
50 %
50 %
40 %
60 %
67 %
33 %
52 %
48 %
53 %
47 %

Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90
US$ 0.70
-0.45
-0.29
-0.54
-0.41
-0.71
-0.63
-0.29
-0.09
-0.49
-0.35
0.36
0.75
-0.32
-0.12
-0.20
0.03
-0.38
-0.20
-0.38
-0.20

Table 8.1: Clearance of agricultural land – cost benefit analysis.
At the actual clearance cost of US$ 0.90 per m2 only agricultural areas in Pailin come out on
the positive side, benefits here surpass costs by 36%. In case the clearance costs could be
lowered to US$ 0.70 per m2, Kampong Cham would also join the positive side, while some
other provinces are approaching break even.
Yet the main conclusion is not that clearance of agricultural areas is unprofitable. There is,
however, a call for conscious prioritization, a planning process capable of identifying those
areas and tasks that are of highest importance to the local communities, for agricultural
production and also towards reducing prevailing high risks of mine/Uxo accidents. This
seems to concern provinces like Siem Reap and Pursat in particular.
Cost efficient methods in clearance and improved area reduction techniques are also highly
important issues. This will be imperative for the conception of strategies concerning all types
of suspected areas, providing that Cambodia is aiming at fulfilment of its obligations towards
the Ottawa Convention, and in view of a possible shift of interest in the donor community
away from financing mine action.
The distribution of benefits between production gains and reduced human loss, reflect the
observed differences in output among the individual provinces regarding agricultural
production (chapter 6.1), and the efficiency of area clearance as a means towards reducing
accident risks and number of casualties (chapter 5).

8.3
Irrigation systems
For irrigation canals it has been presumed that clearance of the canal area will benefit a much
wider extent of agricultural land. One km of irrigation canals could thus allow dry-season
irrigation of 1 km2 agricultural land, while 1 km of canal may constitute a clearance task of
only 4 ha. The benefits to the farmers materialise from the possibility of dry season crops on
the land (see chapter 6.2). From the statistics it appears that some provinces in Cambodia
offer few possibilities for dry season replanting, and these have not been included here.
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Provinces
Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Average/others

Irrigation canals
Production
Human loss
Per cent of benefits
95 %
5%
98 %
2%
99 %
1%
94 %
6%
84 %
16 %
93 %
7%
96 %
4%
95 %
5%

Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90
US$ 0.70
5.4
7.3
3.5
4.7
4.1
5.5
4.4
5.9
3.4
4.6
4.6
6.2
6.0
8.1
4.6
6.1

Table 8.2: Clearance of irrigation canals – cost benefit analysis.
Table 8.2 demonstrates that benefits accruing from the use of irrigation canals have no
difficulties with justifying the clearance costs. The main factor is the assumption that renewed
access to irrigation opens up for dry season cultivation of a much larger area than the one that
needs to be cleared. Benefits are in the range of over 300% to 800% larger than the costs, and
clearance could be undertaken even in cases when costs are found to be substantially higher
than the alternatives applied in table 8.2.
The variations among regions reflect mainly the experienced differences in dry season output
of crops and the price of paddy. The gains related to avoided human loss constitute a less
important percentage, but this is only due to the fact that the cleared areas are small compared
to the extent of the agricultural area that can be reclaimed for dry-season cultivation. The
expected casualty reduction per unit of area cleared is thus the same as in table 8.1.
8.4
Wells and water supply
The benefits from clearance of wells are based on the savings experienced by the local
community from renewed access to water supply in the vicinity, that is to say the reduced
travelling cost to distant sources. The savings comprise reduced travel expenses and time loss
for those family members occupied with fetching water (chapter 6.6).

Provinces
Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Preah Vihear
Average/others

Clearance of wells
Improved access Human loss
Per cent of benefits
92 %
8%
98 %
2%
98 %
2%
93 %
7%
92 %
8%
85 %
15 %
90 %
10 %
94 %
6%
93 %
7%
93 %
7%

Table 8.3: Clearance of wells – cost benefit analysis.
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Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90
US$ 0.70
3.1
4.3
2.8
3.9
2.8
3.9
3.0
4.2
3.1
4.2
3.4
4.7
3.2
4.4
3.0
4.2
3.1
4.2
3.0
4.2

As shown in table 8.3 the benefits from clearance of wells for local water supply has no
difficulties with defending the costs. Benefits are in the range of 280% to 470% larger than
the costs, which means that clearance could also be undertake in cases when the costs for
some reason were substantially higher than the two alternatives in table 8.3.
The contribution towards reduced human loss makes up a smaller percentage of the benefits.
This is, however, only a consequence of the limited areas that need to be cleared (0.2 ha on
the average) in order to gain renewed access to the water supply. The casualty reduction per
unit of area cleared is thus the same as previously applied in the analysis. The reduced human
loss is on the other hand the only factor that causes variations among provinces here. The user
benefits from renewed access to wells are presumed identical for all provinces in this analysis.

8.5
Roads and bridges
The benefits from clearance of roads and bridges materialise as a consequence of renewed
access to shorter alternative routes between origin and destination for the road traffic. It has
been assumed that the travelling distance on the average can be reduced with 1 km after demining. The benefits from the improved access comprise both reduced vehicle operating costs
and saved travel time for people using the roads (see chapter 6.4).

Provinces
Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Preah Vihear
Average/others

Clearance of roads and bridges
Improved access
Human loss
Per cent of benefits
90 %
10 %
97 %
3%
98 %
2%
92 %
8%
91 %
9%
82 %
18 %
88 %
12 %
92 %
8%
91 %
9%
91 %
9%

Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70
2.3
3.3
2.1
3.0
2.1
3.0
2.3
3.2
2.3
3.3
2.7
3.7
2.4
3.4
2.3
3.2
2.3
3.3
2.3
3.2

Table 8.4: Clearance of roads and bridges – cost benefit analysis.
Table 8.4 shows that the benefits from renewed access to direct routes can be considerably
larger that the costs generally required for the clearance of roads and bridges. The benefits are
in the range of 200% to 370% larger than the costs. Clearance of roads and bridges could
thus be undertaken also in cases of a substantially higher cost levels.
The moderate contribution from reduced human loss reflects the elevated benefits from the
improved access to direct routes. The casualty reduction per unit of area cleared is thus the
same as previously applied in the analysis. The reduced human loss is moreover the only
factor that causes variations among provinces. The road users’ benefits from access to more
direct routes are presumed identical for all the provinces in this analysis.
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8.6
School premises
The expected benefits from clearance of school premises are based on an approach similar to
wells and roads, namely the saved travel cost and travel time for the schoolchildren. When the
village school premises are contaminated with mines the pupils will presumably have to travel
a longer distance to some neighbouring school where it is possible to crowd in. The benefits
comprise reduced travelling expenses in the form of vehicle operating costs and saved travel
time (see chapter 6.5).

Provinces
Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Preah Vihear
Average/others

Clearance of schools
Improved access Human loss
Per cent of benefits
83 %
17 %
95 %
5%
96 %
4%
86 %
14 %
84 %
16 %
71 %
29 %
80 %
20 %
86 %
14 %
85 %
15 %
85 %
15 %

Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90
US$ 0.70
0.97
1.54
0.72
1.21
0.71
1.20
0.91
1.45
0.95
1.51
1.32
1.99
1.05
1.63
0.90
1.45
0.94
1.49
0.92
1.47

Table 8.5: Clearance of school premises – cost benefit analysis.
The benefits from clearance of school premises are to a large extent capable of defending their
costs. The benefits from renewed access to near by facilities can exceed costs on their own
account, but the fact that the mined school area in addition represents a risk of accidents
constitutes an important additional factor to take into account. The difference among
provinces in table 8.5 reflects this contribution to reduced human loss. Benefits could be from
about 70% to almost 200% larger than the costs.

8.7
Historical sites and temples
The principal benefits from clearance of historical sites and temple areas in Cambodia will be
the prospects of revenues from the expanding tourist industry. Revenues caused by the
opening up of new areas have been estimated on basis of today’s earnings from similar places
(Angkor), with a cautious optimism as of the future prospects for the development of new
areas (see chapter 6.7).

Clearance of 100% of area
Clearance of 75% of area

Tourist revenues
Human loss
Per cent of benefits
85 %
15 %
88 %
12 %

Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70
0,79
1,30
1,29
1,95

Table 8.6: Clearance of historical sites and temples – cost benefit analysis.
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Still, as shown in table 8.6, the benefits from clearance of historical sites and temple areas
have generally no difficulties with defending the costs. The tourist revenues alone would
suffice, but the reduced human loss connected with elimination of the accidents risk when
mined areas are cleared, will also be a counting factor.
Net benefits increase with the reduction of clearance costs per m2, but such tasks could in
general also support high costs if necessary. In some cases the suspected area can be reduced
in advance, so that more than those areas which need clearance can (safely) be opened up for
visitors. In table 8.6 an alternative of 75% clearance is assumed. This could contribute to
increase the net benefits and thus the BCR significantly.

8.8
Health stations
As with other rural infrastructure (roads, schools, and wells) mine clearance with renewed
access to health stations can be justified by the reduced travel time and travel costs for the
villagers that used to attend this particular station. It is here assumed that alternative facilities
are located at a distance that requires an additional travel of 5 km each way (see chapter 6.8).

Number of clients
15 persons a day
20 persons a day

Improved access
Human loss
Per cent of benefits
85 %
15 %
88 %
12 %

Benefit Cost Ratio
US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70
0.82
1.35
1.34
2.01

Table 8.7: Clearance of health stations – cost benefit analysis.
From table 8.7 it appears that the benefits from renewed access to health stations surpass to a
large extent the cost of clearing the premises. Both cost alternatives thus come out with
considerable net surpluses. The benefits will increase proportionally with the number of
clients, that is to say the persons benefiting from a shorter distance to this important facility.
The user benefits from improved access constitute the main parts of the benefits, simply
because they are extensive compared to the area that needs clearance (one health station= 1.2
ha).

8.9
Conclusions
The main conclusions from the cost benefit analysis is that clearance providing renewed
access to important rural infrastructure generally is capable of generating the largest gains
compared with each invested US$. Roads, water supply, schools and health stations are
excellent candidates in a development perspective, and such clearance tasks should be given
priority as far as benefits in economic terms are concerned.
Clearance of historical sites and temples with the aim of attracting tourists should also be
considered for priority. The potential here will depend on the accessibility and on other
infrastructure for receiving the visitors in the vicinity.
In the agricultural sector a high priority should be given to the reopening of irrigation systems
permitting dry season cultivation of arable land. Benefits could here be extensive and have
important consequences for the rural economy and for food production.
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For agricultural land in general it seems less evident that large-scale clearance programmes
can be capable of generating economic benefits in a convincing degree. Clearance tasks
should here be subject to a more thorough selection process in order to determine the priority.
Clearance for casualty reduction also needs to be well targeted in most cases and locations in
order to have the desired effect. The selection will further be dependent on the possibility of
an appropriate identification of those parts of the extensive mined areas in the country that are
generating the bulk of the mine/Uxo accidents, representing an imminent danger to the people
now and in future years with expected population movements etc. In spite of the excellent
statistics on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents in Cambodia, there are lacking elements in the
analysis that could help direct the clearance activity towards the most risky locations.

9.

Evaluation of the Mine Clearance Programme

An evaluation has been made of the Cambodian mine clearance programme for a recent year.
The information about cleared areas with distribution on provinces etc has been fetched from
the 2004 Work Plan, while the distribution of clearance activities on sectors and types of area
is related to the latest available information, mostly for the year 2003. An area of 29 km2 was
planned cleared in the year 2004.
Clearance cost per sq m
Cost Benefit Ratio
Internal Rate of Return

US$ 0.90
0.38
14 %

US$ 0.70
0.78
19 %

Benefits

Development
80 %

Human loss
20 %

Table 9.1: Appraisal of the Cambodian mine clearance programme 2004.
The analysis shows that mine clearance is contributing substantial values to the country and
the economy in general. The benefit cost ratio (BCR) is 0.38, implying that benefits in general
are 38% higher than the costs, on basis of a clearance cost rate of US$ 0.9 per m2. The
internal rate of return will on the same assumptions be 14%. The benefits are distributed with
80% on clearance for development and 20% on the reduced human loss.

Agricultural land
Irrigation canals
Roads, bridges
Wells
Schools
Health centres
Temple areas
Other buildings etc.
Total

Benefits US$ 1000
10 344
3 448
16 669
1 392
2 270
171
238
2 343
36 875

% of benefits
28 %
9%
45 %
4%
6%
0.5 %
0.7 %
6%
100 %

% of area
65 %
2%
19 %
1%
4%
0.4 %
0.6 %
6%
100 %

Table 9.2: Distribution of benefits from the mine clearance programme 2004.
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The benefits from the clearance programme 2004 amount to about US$ 37 million in total.
Roads and bridges make up the largest parts of the benefits with 45%, even though the
clearance tasks under this sector only comprise 19% of the total area cleared. Smaller size
clearance tasks related to irrigation canals also contribute considerably. For agricultural land
the situation is inverse, it constitutes as much as 65% of the cleared area while contributing
28% of the benefits.
It is clear that the programme net benefits in economic terms could be enhanced by diverting
more of the clearance activity towards rural infrastructure like roads, water supply, schools
etc, and also to sites attracting tourism. The agricultural sector could improve its contribution
by active identification of tasks comprising irrigation components. Future benefits from the
programme could be increased significantly through a reduction in clearance costs, utilisation
of mine dogs to a larger degree for example, lowering the costs to US$ 0.7 per m2. Benefits
could then increase to a level 78% higher than the costs, equivalent to an internal rate of
return of 19% (table 9.1).

Battambang
Pursat
Siem Reap
Otdar Meanchey
Banteay Meanchey
Pailin
Kampong Thom
Kampong Cham
Preah Vihear
Total

Benefits
US$ 1000
9146
3829
1332
7210
6305
1546
1208
320
5991
36886

Cost
US$ 1000
6292
3060
1070
5312
4580
742
752
140
4726
26673

Distribution
of benefits
25 %
10 %
4%
20 %
17 %
4%
3%
1%
16 %
100 %

Benefit-cost
ratio (BCR)
0,45
0,25
0,24
0,36
0,38
1,08
0,61
1,28
0,27
0,38

Benefits
Human loss Development
23 %
77 %
6%
94 %
7%
93 %
19 %
81 %
23 %
77 %
33 %
67 %
26 %
74 %
13 %
87 %
23 %
77 %
20 %
80 %

Table 9.3: Clearance programme 2004, distribution of benefits and clearance cost on province
Regarding the distribution of benefits and clearance costs on province the main conclusions
are as follows:
–

Benefits cover clearance costs in all provinces.

–

The 4 provinces of Battambang, Odtar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Preah
Vihear collect the bulk (78%) of the benefits from the 2004 clearance programme.

–

The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is, however, highest in Kampong Cham and Pailin.

–

The main part of the benefits comes from gains related to economic development.
Still the reduced human loss is an essential factor, contributing to increase the
programme benefits particularly in Pailin.
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10. Poverty Reduction and Millennium Development Goals
10.1
Assumptions
The mine action programme is actively contributing to the socio-economic development of
the country, and in particular to the achievement of goals related to the poverty reduction
strategy and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Specific problems with the
fulfilment of MDG 9: “De-mining, Uxo and Victim Assistance” have been discussed
previously in the report, with the assessment of the programme achievements (chapter 4.3)
among others. This chapter will therefore concentrate on the impact of the mine action
programme in other areas related to poverty reduction and MDGs.
The analysis is based on clearance statistics for the period 1992-2003 broken down on
provinces. This statistics is, however, incomplete and no information has been obtained from
RCAF. 85 Still this information gives presumably the best available distribution of the amount
of areas cleared during the period 1992-2003 in per cent on each province. The total amount
of areas cleared, about 250 km2, has thus been distributed accordingly.
Regarding the type of areas cleared, the analysis has to rely on information from recent years,
mainly 2003 (as of figure 4.2), since information of this aspect is scarce for the preceding
years. There is also little information about the type of areas cleared broken down on province
level. The same pro rata distribution has therefore been used for all the provinces.
Information particularly scarce regarding RCAF’s activities; still the total area cleared by
RCAF has been included here. There is reason to believe, however, that more information
would reveal a larger percentage of road clearance by RCAF than is the case for the other
agencies.

10.2 Increased food production
Constituting 65% of the cleared areas in general, it is found that over 160 km2 of agricultural
land has been cleared by the Cambodian mine action programme during the period 19922003. 86 The largest share of this land is found in the provinces Banteay Meanchey,
Battambang and Siem Reap, reflecting the fact that the largest part of the clearance activities
has taken place in those provinces over the period considered.
Presuming that these areas are taken into use for paddy-growing, they could yield a net
amount of over 20,000 tonnes of paddy at disposal for consumption (table 10.1). The
assumptions of net yield in tonnes per ha etc are then the same as in table 6.1.
Additionally a total of over 140 km of irrigation canals have been cleared in the period. One
km of irrigation canals could supposedly feed 1 km2 of arable land with water, making
cultivation of that land possible also in the dry season, a total of two paddy crops a year (see
chapter 6.2). This additional dry season crop could boost rice production even more,
presumably with over 30,000 tonnes in total in the principal mine and Uxo-infested provinces.
The increase in paddy production could thus amount to over 50,000 tonnes on a yearly basis
in total for these provinces compared to the pre-clearance levels (before 1992). This

85
86

Some problems with this statistics are discussed in chapter 4.3.
Comprising land for agriculture and resettlement in the clearance statistics and figure 4.2.
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production has been made possible on reclaimed agricultural land and through renewed access
to irrigation canals.

Banteay Meanchey
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pailin
Kep
Odtar Meanchey
Preah Vihear
Pursat
Siem Reap
Total

Agricultural
land cleared
ha
4 562
3 902
499
797
880
795
354
367
1 464
268
371
2 158
16 416

Irrigation
canals
km
40.7
34.8
4.4
7.1
7.8
7.1
3.2
3.3
13.0
2.4
3.3
19.2
146.4

Annual yield
tonnes
15 832
16 132
2 982
2 938
3 515
3 005
1 305
402
1 375
350
1 572
7 465
56 874

Increase in
production
per cent
8%
6%
1%
3%
2%
2%
100 %
13 %
5%
1%
1%
4%
3%

Families
resettled
1000
45.6
39.0
5.0
8.0
8.8
7.9
3.5
3.7
14.6
2.7
3.7
21.6
164.2

Table 10.1: Effects on annual agricultural production volume from clearance during the
programme period 1992-2003.
Table 10.1 distributes the effect on agricultural production on provinces. In general there is a
3% growth in paddy production which can be directly related to clearance under the mine
action programme.
In some areas, however, the effect could be stronger. In the small province of Pailin about
half of the area at disposal for paddy cultivation today (2002-03) has been subject to
mine/Uxo clearance, according to the analysis here. With an addition of 3.2 km of irrigation
canals cleared, it seems that large parts of the agricultural areas now at disposal in the
province could have been affected by the mine clearance programme. 87 Kep is another small
province where mine action could have had decisive impacts on the availability of arable land.
In the larger mine-infested provinces like Banteay Meanchey, Battambang and Odtar
Meanchey, the contribution from mine action towards increase in food production could have
been between 8% and 5%, which is still significant.
Clearance of areas that can be reclaimed for agricultural production could thus have strong
impacts for MDG 1- Overall target 2, concerned with reducing the proportion of people
suffering from hunger.
With the establishment of a transparent and equitable system for redistribution of the
reclaimed land, which is a main goal under the mine action programme, the clearance of areas
for resettlement will in general also be important for MDG 7- Overall target 16, to improve
the access to land security.
The plot size needed for a family may be about 2 ha, but in most cases only parts of it will be
mine/Uxo contaminated. Clearance of about 1000 m2 may thus allow a family to settle and
reclaim the larger area needed to subsist. On this assumption the clearance programme could
have benefited over 160,000 families over the period 1992-2003, or more than 13,000 on the
87

The previous reservations are still valid, however; the information of agricultural areas and irrigation canals
cleared in each province are calculated figures, and not based on detailed statistics.
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average each year (varying according to the annual amount of clearance activity). The
geographical distribution is given in table 10.1, with the provinces of Banteay Meanchey,
Battambang and Siem Reap as the main beneficiaries.

10.3 Rural transport
The existence of an extensive rural roads network is an important element in the food security
strategy. The road network can provide efficient transport of produce out of regions with
surpluses and into regions exposed to bad harvests and drought, thus encouraging the
domestic trade in foodstuffs i.a.
In general the access to roads is vital for development of the rural areas, for poverty reduction
and access to social services in general. The much needed expansion of the Cambodian
agricultural sector for example is depending on access to transport.
Clearance of rural roads has been a main component in mine action. It is estimated that a total
of over 1000 km of roads have been cleared during the programme period 1992-2003.
Frequently there will, however, be significant needs for rehabilitation, so as a rule the
clearance activities constitute integral parts of rural roads programmes.
There is actually a gazetted network of 4,700 km of rural roads in Cambodia, while
ungazetted roads and tracks might comprise as much as 28,000 km. Under the cooperation
programme financed by Germany (TRIP), about 1,600 km have been rehabilitated.

Banteay Mean Chey
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pailin
Kep
Odtar Meanchey
Preah Vihear
Pursat
Total

Roads km
332
284
36
58
64
58
26
27
106
20
27
1037

Table 10.2: Clearance of roads under the mine action programme 1992-2003.
10.4 Water supply, schools and health stations.
De-mining school premises can contribute to fulfilling MDG 2- Overall target 3, aiming at
improving the education system so that more children can be able to complete school. It is
estimated that a total of over 800 schools have been cleared of mines/Uxo under the mine
action programme 1992-2003.
Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide access to rural health stations, which are
much needed in the fight against the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria (MDG 6)
and to reduce child mortality (MDG 4) and maternal mortality (MGD 5). It is estimated that
about 60 health stations have been cleared under the mine action programme.
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Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells could have a direct impact on MDG 7Overall target 14, addressing the problem of improved access to safe drinking water. As much
as 1400 wells and ponds could have been cleared in the course of the mine action programme
1992-2003.
Clearance of rural roads will frequently constitute an important supplement as a prerequisite
to gain access to other rural infrastructure and social services.

Banteay Mean Chey
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Speu
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pailin
Kep
Odtar Meanchey
Preah Vihear
Pursat
Total

Wells
450
385
49
79
87
78
35
36
144
26
37
1407

Schools
258
221
28
45
50
45
20
21
83
15
21
806

Health stations
21
18
2
4
4
4
2
2
7
1
2
64

Table 10.3: Clearance of wells, schools and health stations under the mine action programme
1992-2003.
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11. Main Conclusions
Mine action is contributing substantial values to the Cambodian economy and the country in
general. Analysis of the 2004 clearance programme comes out with a benefit cost ratio (BCR)
of 0.38, implying that benefits are in general 38% higher than the costs, on basis of an average
clearance cost rate of US$ 0.9 per m2. The internal rate of return will on the same assumptions
be 14%.
The benefits amount to about US$ 37 million in total, distributed with 80% on clearance for
development and 20% on reduced human loss. Roads and bridges make up the largest parts
with 45%, even though such clearance tasks only comprise 19% of the total area cleared.
Smaller size tasks related to irrigation canals also contribute considerably. For agricultural
land the situation is inverse, it constitutes as much as 65% of the cleared area while making
up 28% of the benefits. In total about 29 km2 of mined areas were planned cleared in 2004.
The benefits from renewed access to more direct road links can be considerably larger that the
costs required for clearance. Clearance of roads and bridges could thus be undertaken also in
cases of relatively high cost levels. The benefits from renewed access to wells for local water
supply, schools and health stations have likewise few difficulties with justifying clearance, on
basis of the reduced travel time and travel costs for the users and the pupils.
These are excellent candidates in a development perspective, and such tasks should be given
priority as far as benefits in economic terms are concerned. It is evident that the programme
benefits could be enhanced by diverting more of the clearance activity towards rural
infrastructure like roads, water supply, schools etc, and also to sites attracting tourism.
The output per ha of arable land is on the average rather moderate in Cambodia. Yet the main
conclusion is not that clearance of agricultural areas is unprofitable. There is, however, a call
for conscious prioritization, a planning process capable of identifying those areas and tasks
that are of highest importance to the local communities.
In the agricultural sector high priority should be given to the reopening of irrigation systems
permitting dry season cultivation of arable land. Benefits could here be extensive and have
important consequences for the rural economy and for food production.
Clearance for casualty reduction also needs to be well targeted in most cases and locations in
order to have the desired effect. Improved assessments could be made of which parts of the
extensive mined area in the country that are generating the bulk of the mine/Uxo accidents,
representing a danger to the people now and in future years with expected population
movements etc. In spite of the excellent statistics on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents in
Cambodia, there are lacking elements in the analysis that could help direct the clearance
activity towards the most risky locations.
Benefits cover clearance costs in all provinces. The 4 provinces of Battambang, Odtar
Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Preah Vihear collect the bulk (78%) of the benefits from
the 2004 clearance programme. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is, however, highest in
Kampong Cham and Pailin. The main part of the benefits comes from gains related to
economic development. Still the reduced human loss is an essential factor, contributing to
increase the benefits from land clearance particularly in Pailin.
Mine action’s contribution in the years 1992-2003 to increase the country’s paddy production
could amount to over 50,000 tonnes annually. This production increase has been made
possible on reclaimed agricultural land and through renewed access to irrigation canals. This
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constitutes in general a 3% growth in paddy production in the mine action regions, but could
be even more important for food security in provinces like Pailin, Kep, Banteay Meanchey
and Battambang.
A transparent and equitable system for redistribution of the reclaimed land is an important
goal under the mine action programme. The cleared areas may have provided land and
contributed to improve land security for about 160,000 families over the period 1992-2003,
that is to say for over 13,000 on the average each year.
Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells has improved the access to safe drinking
water in rural areas. An estimated 1400 wells and ponds have been cleared in the course of the
mine action programme 1992-2003.
De-mining school premises contributes to improve the education system so that more children
are able to complete school. Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide access to
rural health stations, which are much needed in the fight against spread of diseases and to
reduce child and maternal mortality. It is estimated that about 60 health stations have been
cleared under the mine action programme.
The CMAA Socio-economic Cluster should in particular have a responsibility with following
up the cost-benefit analysis.
There are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a significant
economic loss. This could call for an improved reporting system, if possible through CMVIS.
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular what parts of
it should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the estimates of
the contaminated area.
The CMAA database on cleared areas needs to be consolidated, so that it can provide official
figures for clearance on location (province, district), types of areas, techniques etc for the
individual years since the start of the mine action programme. As of today this information
exists on different files which can be incomplete and inconsistent.
The operators should be required to provide better data on the cost of conducting mine action
activities. Some operators are in the process of developing their accounting procedures, which
could result in better cost-estimates with more details on different types of areas, tasks and
techniques, information which to a large degree is non-existent now. As a first approach more
information about the clearance time (in hours) of different types of tasks and areas could be
demanded.
A library or Information and Documentation Centre should be established at CMAA to secure
the institutional memory, comprising publications and reports issued by the programme and
its service providers as well as literature related to mine action in general. Documents should
be available in hard copies and/or in electronic format on computers and compact discs to
facilitate copying and dissemination. Fire-protected and waterproof storing conditions should
be provided.
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Annex 1: Planning tools for mine action
A 1: Objective
The objective of this Annex 1 is to devise some straightforward methods, based on costbenefit analysis, to be applied as instruments for assessing socio-economic and poverty
reduction impacts of future mine clearance operations. The approach will be largely identical
with the analysis presented in the previous chapters of this report, but with modifications
making it simple and flexible, not requiring large analytical efforts.
A 2: First step
As a first step the data presented in chapter 8 of this report should be fully utilised. The tables
8.1 to 8.7 display the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for presumably typical clearance tasks related
to standard areas of intervention like:
–

Agricultural land (8.2)

–

Irrigation systems (8.3)

–

Wells and water supply (8.4).

–

Roads and bridges (8.5)

–

School premises (8.6)

–

Historical sites and temples (8.7)

–

Health stations (8.8)

The BCR calculations there are also broken down on the provinces of most importance for the
mine action programme today.
This information could be applied as a first step without any modifications, also in the
analysis of new cases. On basis of knowledge about the use of the cleared area and the
province in which it is located, the BCR of the new clearance task proposed could be read
directly from those tables.

A 3: Second step
A second step will be to modify the input data so that the analysis can be made representative
and reflect in a better way the situation for which it is to be applied. No elements are in
principal fixed in this methodology, but this second step consists of devising some simplified
ways of modelling the main elements of the analysis, without having to go too far into the
spreadsheet details that form the ultimate basis of this report. This second step approach will
thus concentrate on providing the analyst with an opportunity to modify the main cost and
benefit elements of the BCR.
Benefit – Cost

Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR):

Cost
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Clearance costs
The assumptions behind the cost calculation are in this analysis very simple (see chapter 7).
The range of cost alternatives vary between US$ 0.9 per m2 (US$ 9,000 per ha or US$ 0.9
million per km2) as of today’s average cost, to a possible level of US$ 0.7 per m2, in case
more dog-clearance could be an alternative.
For the analysis of future clearance tasks, information should be obtained from the operators
or estimated in other ways as appropriate from case to case. When data is scarce a sensitivity
analysis in two or more alternatives could be performed.
Reduced human loss
The evaluation of the benefits from reduced human loss (chapter 5) is rather complex and
based on a number of assumptions about the value of productive life time, medical costs, the
characteristics of a typical mine victim, age, types of injury etc. The combined effect of these
different factors has been evaluated in economic terms, and the result presented as the
economic loss related to an average mine/Uxo casualty.
As a first step it is assumed that a mined area of 1 km2 can be expected to claim one victim
every year. The costs in economic terms related to this loss are given in table A1 as US$
164,000 (for further reference see chapter 5 in the report).
Table A1: Cost benefit calculations related to the human loss:
(1): Economic loss for an average casualty, one victim every year over 20
years, 1000 US$:
(2): Area to be cleared or suspected area:
(3): Number of victims per unit of mined area:
(4): Economic growth:

164
1 km2.
1 victim per km2.
3.5%

This basic figure of US$ 164,000 can then be modified in the following ways:
–

When the area to be cleared is different from 1 km2, the economic loss (1) will
have to be multiplied with the appropriate relative size of minefield. A mined area
of 2 km2 is thus expected to cause the double loss, that is to say US$ 328,000.

–

The expected number of victims may be different from 1 per year per km2. In the
cost benefit analysis the number of victims varied on province (from 0.4 to 4.7 per
year, see table 5.1). The economic loss (1) in table A1 will therefore have to be
multiplied with the appropriate figure for the expected number of victims, 2
casualties a year will entail the double loss, 1.5 a 50% larger loss etc.

–

In the previous analysis (chapter 5.2) an economic growth of 3.5% was assumed
for the first 10 years and 2.5% afterwards. The economic loss (1) in table A1
should accordingly be updated, from the year 2006 and onwards according to the
development of the Cambodian GNP per capita.
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On basis of these possibilities for modifications new and different estimates of the avoided
human loss can be worked out as appropriate for the case under consideration, reflecting the
available information on local conditions etc.
Agricultural land
The valuation of cleared agricultural land is based on the assumption that it can be used for
paddy production and for raising livestock for own consumption or sale (see chapter 6.1). The
main variables in these calculations are factors like the production yield in tonnes per ha, the
farm-gate price of paddy, the number of animals raised or sold per year (pigs and poultry) and
the sales price for these animals.
A standard case can be constructed, leaving a number of factors open for adaptation to local
circumstances from case to case:
Table A2: Cost-benefit calculations related to agricultural land.
Assumptions:
(1): Paddy growing Yield: 1 tonne per ha Price: 100 US$/tonne
(2): Pigs raising
1 pig per ha land
Price: US$ 50 each
(3): Poultry
10 per ha of land
Price: US$ 2 a piece
(4): Possibility for dry season crops
(5) Total revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land:

Value 1000 US$
75
54
21
SUM

In table A2 the net future revenues expected from paddy growing on 1 km2 of land amount to
a value of US$ 75,000 based on the assumption of a yield of 1 tonne per ha and a price of 100
US$ per tonne. When the conditions related with a specific clearance task are different, the
value of 75,000 US$ should be modified accordingly. In case of a price per tonne of 110 US$
for example, the value will increase by 10% (to US$ 82,500), the same will be the case if the
yield is expected to be 1.1 tonne per ha instead if 1 tonne.
The same approach can be used for modifying the contribution from the livestock business. If
1.5 pigs can be raised annually instead of 1 per ha land, the value should be increased by 50%
from US$ 54,000 to US$ 81,000; price variations will have similar effects. In the analysis
(table 6.1) differences were found in yield per ha and in the number of livestock raised per ha
of agricultural land according to province.
The possibility for dry season crops on the cleared land should be investigated, in particular
the percentage of the land that can normally be replanted. The information in table A2 on
paddy growing (1) could then be used to add the value of an extra crop, specifying the
appropriate yield in tonnes per ha replanted, and the price. Sometimes these will be different
from the wet season crops (see table 6.1).
By adding the modified revenues in table A2 from (1) paddy growing, (2) pigs, (3) poultry
and (4) an extra dry season crop which may be possible on (parts of) the land, the total
amount of revenues from the use of 1 km2 reclaimed agricultural land can be determined.
When the extent of the land to be cleared is different from 1 km2, the sum (5) must be altered
as appropriate.
In some cases it may be found that additional formerly suspected areas can be reclaimed
without clearance, by area reduction techniques etc. An extra percentage may then be added
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to the benefits, without increasing the clearance costs (see chapter 6.1). This must, however,
be investigated from case to case.
To the agricultural benefits from reclaimed land (table A2) will be added the benefits from the
expected reduction of human loss on the same land (table A1). These two elements will form
the benefit side in the benefit-cost ratio (BCR). The clearance costs must then be estimated.
Finally the clearance task can be evaluated by calculating the BCR.
Irrigation canals
The benefits from clearance of irrigation canals are related to the extra output from the land
which gains renewed access to irrigation as a direct cause of the clearance. It is assumed that
this land can now produce dry season crops, and a main input to the analysis will therefore be
the estimated value of that extra crop. These benefits will be identical with table A2 (1) paddy
growing, while no changes are here presumably inflicted on the livestock business.
Table A3: Cost-benefit analysis of clearance in irrigation systems.
Assumptions:
(1): Paddy growing Yield: 1 tonne per ha Price: 100 US$/tonne
(2): Total revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land:
(3): One km of irrigation canals will serve 1 km2 of arable land.
(4): One km of irrigation canals constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha.

Value 1000 US$
75
SUM

The value of the dry season paddy crop (1) must, however, be updated with appropriate
estimates for the yield in tonne per ha, which may be higher than in the wet season (see table
6.1), and also for the farm gate price of paddy. This will result in an estimate of the total
revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land (2).
Formerly in the cost benefit analysis it has been assumed that one km of irrigation canals can
serve 1 km2 of arable land with irrigation water for a dry season crop (3). This proportion can,
however, vary from case to case. An independent appraisal should be made about the amount
of land to be irrigated by the particular canal that is considered cleared, so that the revenue
estimate (2) can be modified accordingly (an area of ½ km2 will generate ½ of the revenues).
It was assumed (4) that one km of irrigation canals constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha. The
canal is then cleared in 20 m wide lanes on both sides. This assumption is also open to
modifications, which will affect the cost side of the BCR.
A special feature with irrigation canals is that the area which needs clearance and entails costs
normally will be much smaller than the land which reaps the benefits. The potential for
avoided human loss will, however, be related to the area which has been cleared. This benefit
component should be added (see table A1).
The clearance task can now be evaluated by calculating the BCR.

73

Roads and bridges
In the analysis it was presumed that a kilometre of mined roads will cause diversion of traffic
onto other links of double distance on the average (see chapter 6.4). The benefits from
clearance of 1 km of mined roads will thus consist of the savings to road traffic and transport
from travelling a 1 km shorter route.
This proportion may vary from case to case. The length of the alternative routes should
therefore be assed independently to reflect local conditions and take into account the actual
extra travel distances experienced by the road users.
Table A4: Cost benefit analysis of road clearance
Assumptions:
US$ 1000
(1): Benefits from clearance of 1 km of rural roads
108
(2): One km of mined roads will divert traffic onto routes of double distance.
(3): Traffic level
(4): A 1 km road link constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha.
The additional transport costs when the road users have to travel one km extra is calculated to
US$ 108,000 in table A4 (1). This is the amount that can be saved when the road opened after
clearance shortens the travel distance with one km on the average. The relevant issue here will
be the difference between the distance travelled before and after clearance of a particular road
link. If this difference is larger than 1 km, say 1.5 km, the benefits (1) should be increased by
50%, and in case the difference is only 0.5 km the benefits will be ½ of US$ 108,000.
Another important element for determining the benefit side will be the traffic. This was
estimated on basis of traffic counts in rural areas (table 6.4), comprising a daily traffic of:
–
–
–
–
–
–

Ox-carts: 19.
Bicycles: 13.
Motorbikes: 297.
Motor trailers: 26.
Car/ pickups: 19.
Trucks: 5.

This traffic level is reflected in the benefit estimate of US$ 108,000. Independent estimates
should be made, however, and in case the road traffic in the particular case is found to be
significantly higher or lower, the benefit sum should be amended accordingly. A traffic level
which is generally 25% higher than the figures indicated above will thus generate 25% more
benefits. Particular attention should be made to the level of motorised traffic, as this will have
the largest impact on the benefits.
It was further assumed (4) that one km of road constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha. The road is
then cleared in 20 m wide lanes on both sides. This is standard for clearance tasks ordered by
ADB for instance. The total area to be cleared will then depend on the length of the mined
road, which will determine the clearance costs. The area to be cleared will also form basis for
an estimate of the benefits from the expected reduced human loss (table A2).
The state of repair of the road ought to be taken into account. Clearance tasks regularly form
integral parts of rural roads rehabilitation programmes. Rehabilitation of rural roads may cost
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between US$ 6,000 (upgrading) and US$ 12,000 (improved standard) per km, but the actual
need must here be assessed from case to case.
The clearance task can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR.
Schools
The benefits from clearance of school premises were based on the assumption that the pupils
will have to travel an extra distance of 5 km each way in order to reach an alternative location.
The benefits from saving these travel costs after clearance are given in table A5 as US$
18,000.
Table A5: Cost-benefit analysis of clearance of school premises.
Assumptions:
(1): Benefits from clearance of school premises
(2): Extra travel distance 5 km each way every day.
(3): Number of pupils travelling: 80
(4): School areas constitute clearance tasks of 1.2 ha.

US$ 1000
18

The difference in distance between travelling to the reopened school compared with the
alternatives used before clearance will here be the issue. In case this difference is calculated to
more than 5 km, the benefits will be higher than US$ 18,000. An extra travel distance
calculated to 10 km will here generate the double benefits.
Another factor that will influence the benefit side is the number of pupils at the school. Here it
is assumed that 80 pupils will be travelling. With 60 pupils, or 25% less, the benefits from
reopening the school will also be 25% less.
It was assumed that a school area constitutes a clearance task of 1.2 ha. This area might,
however, vary from case to case. Clearance costs will depend on the extent of the area to be
cleared. Possible repair costs should be taken into account, but not upgrading. The cleared
area will also form basis for an estimate of the benefits from reduced human loss (table A2).
The project can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR. Here the two benefit components,
reduced travel distance for the pupils and reduced human loss will be compared to the
clearance costs.
Wells and water supply
The benefits from clearance of rural wells can also be related to the extra travel distance
needed for the villagers to reach an alternative supply. Here it has been assumed that the extra
distance to the nearest source could be 5 km longer on the average each way. Further it has
been assumed that 15 persons are occupied with the daily fetching of water. The travel costs
related to this extra distance for the 15 persons involved can then be saved after de-mining of
the local well. These total benefits have been calculated to US$ 6,800 (see chapter 6.6).
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Table A6: Cost-benefit analysis of water supply
Assumptions:
(1): Benefits from clearance of wells
(2): Extra distance to nearest source: 5 km each way
(3): Persons occupied with fetching water: 15
(4): Wells constitute clearance tasks of 0.2 ha

US$ 1000
6.8

The benefit will depend on the extra distance travelled, which should be assessed
independently in each case. A 25% larger difference in travel distance between the reopened
local water supply and the alternatives used before clearance will increase the benefits with
about 25%.
The size of the local community using the well, reflected in the number of persons engaged in
fetching water will also be of importance. In case of a larger community with 30 persons
travelling to fetch water, the benefits from clearing the local water supply will rise to the
double that is to say US$ 13,600.
An important factor will be the extent of the area which needs to be cleared. Based on
experience it was assumed in the analysis that a well may constitute a clearance task of 0.2 ha.
This must be assessed, however, from case to case. Clearance costs will depend on the area
size. Possible repair costs should be taken into account. The cleared area will also form basis
for an estimate of the benefits from the expected reduced human loss (table A2).
The project can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR. Here the two benefit components,
reduced travel distance to fetch water and reduced human loss will be compared to the
clearance costs.
Health stations
A similar model as applied above for schools and wells can be used also for calculating the
benefits from clearance of health station areas. It was assumed that when the premises are
mined, people from the neighbouring villages may have to travel on the average 5 km longer
each way to reach the nearest facility. In addition there were presumably 15 persons attending
the particular health station on a daily basis (see chapter 6.8).
The total benefits from avoiding this extra travel effort have been calculated to US$ 16,700 in
table A7.
Table A7: Cost-benefit analysis of clearance of health stations
Assumptions:
(1): Benefits from clearance of health stations, US$ 1000
(2): Additional travel distance 5 km each way
(3): Persons travelling: 15 daily
(4): Health stations constitute clearance tasks of 1.2 ha

US$ 1000
16.7

The benefits will depend on the extra distance travelled, which should be assessed
independently in each case. A 25% larger difference in travel distance between the reopened
local health station and the alternatives used before clearance will increase the benefits with
25%.
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The size of the local community using the health station, or the number of visitors, will also
be of importance. In case of a larger community with 30 daily visitors, the benefits from
clearance will be the double that is to say US$ 33,400.
An important factor is the size of the area that needs to be cleared. Based on experience it was
assumed in the analysis that a well could constitute a clearance task of 1.2 ha. This must be
assessed, however, from case to case. Clearance costs will depend on the area size. Possible
repair costs, but not upgrading, should be taken into account. The cleared area will also form
basis for an estimate of the benefits from reduced human loss (table A2).
The project can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR. Here the two benefit components,
reduced travel distance to the health centre and reduced human loss will be compared to the
clearance costs.
Temple areas and tourism
The benefits from clearance of temple areas are related to the net revenues the country can
gain from the extra tourists attracted and the expected expansion of the tourist industry. The
benefits from opening up an additional km2 of temple areas have thus been calculated to US$
1.36 million in extra future revenues (see chapter 6.7).
Table A8: Cost benefit analysis for clearance of temple areas
Assumptions:
US$ 1000
(1): Benefits from opening up 1 km2 of temple areas
1362
(2): Tourist contribution to GNP: US$ 200 per visitor
(3): Number of tourists: 800 per km2 of temple area reopened per year.
These incomes will be dependent on a number of factors, a contribution to GNP of US$ 200
per visitor, and a number of new tourists amounting to 800 annually per km2 of temple area
reopened. Revised assumptions here will cause corresponding relative changes in the amount
of benefits (1), 25% fewer visitors will thus cause 25% less revenues etc.
Revenues and clearance costs will also be proportionate with the size of the area to be cleared
and reopened for tourism. The cleared area will also form basis for an estimate of the benefits
from the expected reduced human loss (table A2).
The clearance task can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR.
Other buildings
The benefits from clearance tasks involving buildings (public offices etc) can often be related
to the corresponding construction costs and/or the value of the terrain. The state of repair of
the building must then be taken into account.

A 4: Third step
A third step might consist of courses in cost-benefit analysis in mine action, using the
methodology provided in this report or extended versions. The participants would then be
introduced to the full version of cost-benefit analysis with the accompanying spreadsheet
facilities. New studies could be undertaken based on disaggregated data as appropriate.
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Annex 2: Persons and institutions contacted
Name

Position

Institution

Mr Dominique Pierre
Guéret

Senion Mine Action
Consultant

Mr Julien Chevillard

Mine Action and Aid
Coordination
Specialist
Secretary General
CMAA

Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
UNDP-Cambodia

HE Sam Sotha

Mr Leng Sochea

Deputy Secretary
General CMAA

Mr Niem Chouleng
Mr Lim Sothy

Advisor
Programme Assistant

Mr Robert Griffin

Managing Partner

Mr In Channa

Deputy Director
Database Department

Mr Boeun Chan Born

Senior Socio-economic
Officer, SocioEconomic Cluster
Regional Resident
Representative

Mr Marc Bonnet

Ms Krisna Uk
Mr Ian Thomas

Mr Robert Keeley
Mr Chhiv Lim
Mr David Hayter
Mr Chikahiro
Masuda

Programme
Development officer
Technical Advisor

Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Consultant
Project Manager
Country Programme
Manager
Assistant Resident
Representative

Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
Council of Ministers
Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
Griffin and Emili
International Consultants
Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
Norwegian People’s Aid –
South East Asia
Norwegian People’s Aid –
South East Asia
Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority
(CMAA)
RK Consulting
Cambodia Mine/Uxo Victim
Information System (CMVIS)
Mines Advisory Group
(MAG)
Japan International
Cooperation Agency

(Continued)
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e-mail:
telephone:
dominique.gueret@undp.org
855 12657720
julien.chevillard@undp.org
855 23216167
samsotha@camnet.com.kh
855 12815055
sochea@forum.org.kh
011 811257
012 494500
sothy.lim@undp.org
855 12607816
gande@hawaii.rr.com
808 9518823
inchanna@cmaa.gov.kh
012 855596

marc.bonnet@cambodia.npaid.org
855 23 210383
855 12 817219
krisna.uk@cambodia.npaid.org
855 12 627973
Free_world_maps@hotmail.com
012 311076
bobkeeley@compuserve.com
44 (0) 7788 585828
cmvis@bigpond.com.kh
855 23 216075
cpm@mag.org.kh
855 (0) 23 215115
masuda.chikahiro@ica.go.jp
855 0 23 211673

Name

Position

Institution

Gen. Khem Sophoan

Director General

HE Heng Ratana

Deputy Director
General

Cambodian Mine Action
Center (CMAC)
Cambodian Mine Action
Center (CMAC)
Cambodian Mine Action
Center (CMAC)
Handicap International

Col. Jean Pierre
Billault
Ms Edith van
Wijngaarden
Mr Sao Sopheap
Mr Richard Boulter

Rehabilitation Department Coordinator
Assistant
representative
Programme manager

Mr Michael Bartura

Finance manager

Mr Mean Sarun

Demining Unit Manger CMAC Demining Unit 6

Mr Ron J Davies

Consultant

Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO)
The Halo Trust
The Halo Trust

CMAC
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e-mail:
telephone:
khsophoan@cmac.org.kh
855 12 722333
hrattana@cmac.org.kh
855 12 800169
855 12 858010
hib.rehab_dpt@online.com.kh
855 12 651228
sopheap.sao@fao.org
855 12 814673
halocambodia@online.com.kh
855 12 801809
halocambodia@everyday.com.kh
855 12 896840
Billault.jp@camintel.com
855 12 630292
rdavies@cmac.org.kh
855 012 683341
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